

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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Mood and Negation
in Spanish Noun Clauses

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Linguistics

by

Tito Nelson Oviedo

1974

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
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
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To Lucinda, my mother.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Mood and Negation
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Two aspects of Spanish noun clauses are discussed independently: (1) Mood alternations, and (2) NEG-raising. The first aspect is studied in the first two chapters; the second in the third chapter. In Chapter I several previous analyses of mood alternations in noun clauses are examined and shown to be inadequate. A major defect of these analyses is lack of flexibility, especially in the requirement that the semantic notions of assertion, doubt, opinion, etc. associated with the noun clause must be matched with identical notions expressed in the matrix, and in the claim that the choice of mood in the noun clause is associated uniquely with one particular notion. For the most part, linguists who have analyzed mood distinctions in Spanish have ignored a great many facts and pragmatic factors that play a role in speech and in mood alternations, and which suggest that the choice of mood is more flexible than has been assumed.

In Chapter II an alternative analysis of mood alternations is proposed, based on a series of binary choices that the speaker makes in relation to the events and states (E) to be verbalized. These choices form a hierarchic system which contains essential factors of two types: (A) Factors related to the speaker's cognition about the truth of E; and (B) factors related to impressionistic effects that the speaker wants to achieve. All these factors are represented as binary features: (A) Cognition: [+/- PRESUPPOSED], [+/- OPTATIVE]; (B) Impressionistic: [+/- FOCUS], [+/- EMPHATIC], [+/- Truth value]. The Indicative is associated with the following sets of features: [+ PRESUPPOSED, + FOCUS], [- PRESUPPOSED, + OPTATIVE, + EMPHATIC], and [-PRESUPPOSED, -OPTATIVE, + Truth value]. The Subjunctive is associated with the following sets of features: [+ PRESUPPOSED, - FOCUS], [- PRESUPPOSED, + OPTATIVE, - EMPHATIC], and [- PRESUPPOSED, - OPTATIVE, -Truth value]. In addition to these factors, which essentially determine the choice of mood in noun clauses, certain other, minor, factors that may influence the choice of mood, are briefly examined (discourse context and interpersonal relations, or "manners").

In Chapter III, the proposal that Spanish has a rule of NEG-raising, which moves a negative morpheme from an embedded into a matrix sentence, is discussed. It is argued that this rule is not the best way to explain certain semantic and syntactic facts of Spanish. An alternative analysis is

proposed: NEG can be generated directly in the underlying structure of the matrix sentence, and its reading is extended to the noun clause, via interpretive rules.

INTRODUCTION

The original plan of this work included three aspects related to complex sentences which contain noun clauses (i.e. clauses that function as either subjects or objects of the sentence): (i) Mood alternations in noun clauses, (ii) Infinitival clauses (or reduced noun clauses), and (iii) The rule that moves to a higher sentence the negative morpheme no generated in a noun clause (NEG-raising).

Because of time limitations, however, I decided to leave out Infinitival clauses, although I had already done a considerable amount of research in this area. My main concern was whether or not a rule which deletes the subject NP of a noun clause if it is identical to a higher NP (Equi-NP deletion) is part of the grammar of Spanish. In the light of a great many facts of Spanish, I was inclined to claim that although Equi-NP deletion is supported by sentences containing a dative NP in the higher sentence (e.g. Les pedí regresar pronto 'I asked them to come back soon') this rule may not be necessary to interpret the subject of the infinitival clause.

With infinitival clauses discarded, the subject matter of the present work is limited to mood alternations, on the one hand, and to the question of NEG-raising, on the other. Since the Indicative-Subjunctive alternation has been one of the most difficult problems to explain, I chose it as the

major issue of my dissertation. This is why the first two chapters are devoted to this problem. Chapter I reviews several previous analyses, all of which are found inadequate to explain mood alternations in Spanish noun clauses. Chapter II contains my alternative analysis. I propose a hierarchic system based on factors of two types: (A) Cognitive, and (B) Impressionistic. This system represents a series of binary choices made by the speaker in the verbalization of events or states (E).

Chapter III deals with NEG-raising. I argue (a) that the evidence for NEG-raising is weak; and (b) that this rule is not the best way to explain the semantics of sentences containing higher vs. lower NEG's. I propose, instead, that NEG can be generated either in the higher S, or in the lower S, or both in the higher and the lower S's, or in none of the S's. And the semantics of S's containing (or not) NEG's are better explained in terms of interpretive rules.

Chapter I

Previous Analyses of the Spanish Mood Alternations in Noun Clauses. A Critical Review.

0. Introductory remarks

All of the analyses of the mood alternations in Spanish seem to agree that semantic factors of some sort or other play a role in the choice of mood. Nevertheless, there exist discrepancies among the different analyses as to the nature of these factors and the way they are to be captured in a grammar of Spanish. Although at least two different approaches can be identified, they are not mutually exclusive. No linguist seems to be committed to a single approach. The two approaches can be characterized in the following way:

(A) The choice of mood is, in general, dependent upon a superordinate or higher element, such as a Verb Phrase, a Noun, etc., which can be either actual or abstract.¹ Presumably the Indicative and the Subjunctive stand in complementary distribution. The mood alternation is significant only in instances in which either mood can occur freely in embedded sentences to signal a semantic contrast (e.g. the Subjunctive is associated with an imperative reading, and the Indicative with a declarative reading when the sentence is embedded in a matrix sentence containing the verb decir 'to tell'). For examples

of this approach, see, for instance, Bello [1925], Bull [1965], Stockwell et al. [1965], Togeby [1953], Lakoff [1968], Alarcos [1970].

(B) The choice of mood is determined by the semantic content of the whole sentence, and not simply by a higher element. The superordinate clause and the subordinate clause are semantically paired in terms of abstract semantic notions (or features). Examples of this approach can be found in Lenz [1925], Spaulding [1952], Seco [1972], Rivero [1971], Terrell and Hooper [1972], Rojas [1969], Hadlich [1971], Lozano [1972].

0.1 For most linguists the Indicative is assumed to be basic and the Subjunctive derived (e.g. Lakoff [1968], Stockwell et al. [1965], Rojas [1969]). For others (Chomsky [1965], Klima (class lectures 1964-1965 cited by Lakoff [1968:161])), the mood distinction is directly generated by the PS rules. And for still others (Hooper [1972]) the mood alternation is neither introduced transformationally nor generated directly by the PS rules, but directly associated with semantic notions. This issue will be ignored in this review.

0.2 While the vast majority of linguists treat the mood distinction differently for the different grammatical functions of the clauses in which it takes place (i.e. one kind

of analysis for noun clauses, another for relative clauses, etc.), very few have attempted to make a single generalization covering all of the occurrences of the mood alternation (one instance where the writer did try to cover all instances with a single generalization is Lozano [1972]). In this study, as in most others, it will be assumed that we are not in a position to make one single generalization for all the cases of mood alternation. We restrict our concern to mood alternation in noun clauses.

0.3 Finally, as far as the Subjunctive is concerned, opinion is apparently divided as to whether there is one single Subjunctive with different interpretations (e.g. dubitative, optative, etc.), as in Stockwell et al. [1965], and Terrell and Hooper [1972], or several classes of Subjunctives (e.g. a dubitative Subjunctive, an imperative Subjunctive, etc.), as in Bello [1925], and Lakoff [1968]. This aspect is irrelevant for the present study, and it will simply be assumed that both the Indicative and the Subjunctive are surface forms that can be associated with different semantic notions, as will become clear in Chapter II.

1.0 Purpose

In the ensuing discussion I will examine some of the more coherent and explicit proposals for explaining the mood alternations in Spanish noun clauses. I will show that these alternations have not been successfully explained by any

single approach, though some are quite insightful (e.g. Terrell and Hooper [1972], Lenz [1925]).

My arguments against these analyses (taken up in Section 2) are syntactic, semantic, and even pragmatic. They center upon facts that were ignored by most of them. In all fairness, it must be pointed out that most of these analyses have been proposed with pedagogical purposes in mind, and it is perhaps because of this that they have ignored some of the complexities involved in the actual use of mood.

1.1 About the examples. Some Spanish speakers may find some of my examples unacceptable. I base my judgments on my own intuitions, or on evidence that certain examples have been observed in the speech of other native speakers of Spanish. My claim is that the Spanish language in general allows for certain choices of mood that are functional in some dialects, but which can be ruled out in other dialects. This is due, perhaps, to the "marked" nature of certain choices. A particular example might be useful to illustrate my claim.

(1) a. Yo dudo que Juan hizo eso. (IND)

b. Yo dudo que Juan hiciera eso. (SUBJ)

'I doubt that Juan did that.'

For some speakers (I for one) both (1a) and (1b) are perfectly well formed. For other speakers (1a), where the Indicative is used in the noun clause, is unacceptable. (1a) and

(1b) are synonymous in that the truth of the complement is not accepted by the higher subject. But in those dialects in which the mood alternation is allowed these strings differ as follows: in (1a) the higher subject (the speaker, in this case) doubts that the information provided by someone else is true (the noun clause is a "quotation", so to speak, of someone's statement) while in (1b) the higher subject doubts that the event expressed in the noun clause occurred. In the first case, but not in the second, the sentence suggests that the higher subject believes that the "information source" is lying.

There are semantic and/or pragmatic subtleties involved, and the means for expressing them are available in the language system. However, they may not be taken advantage of by all speakers in the same way. This means, then, that in those dialects in which only (1b) is acceptable, there may be ambiguity in this sentence in respect to the subtleties stated above, but these can be disregarded since (1a) and (1b) are synonymous in other respects.

1.2 In the ensuing review I have chosen to take as central the following different analyses: first, Rivero [1971]; second, Hooper [1972], Terrell and Hooper [1972], and Terrell [1974]; and finally, Bull [1965]. The reason is that the arguments raised about any of these analyses will necessarily hold when extended to other similar analyses, since they represent in one way or another all the essentials

of all the analyses known to me, and outlined in (A) and (B) above. In fact, the proposals made in the second set of analyses to be reviewed are attempts to integrate the many different descriptions that have been proposed in the body of literature dealing with this subject.

2.0 Previous analyses

2.1 Rivero [1971] hypothesizes that in certain complements the "Indicative Complementizer" is correlated with (the speaker's) positive presupposition about the truth of the complement, while the Subjunctive implies neutral attitude (i.e. there is no presupposition made by the speaker).

This proposal is essentially similar to those of other grammarians. For instance, Spaulding [1952:29] asserts that when the Indicative is used the statement is considered a reality, in contrast to that which is merely thought of; he adds [pp. 53-55] that the Subjunctive implies that a statement is made with doubt or hesitation as to its reality. Alarcos [1970:61-62] takes a similar position in distinguishing "forms that do not indicate irreality (i.e. the Indicative--TNO) and forms that indicate irreality (i.e. the Subjunctive--TNO)." Thus, whatever arguments are raised against Rivero [1971] are also raised against analyses that make reference to "reality", since this is interpretable as "positive presupposition". One clarification is necessary: in her analysis, Rivero does not mention "irreality" as a

correlate of the Subjunctive; she mentions "neutral attitude", or "no presupposition". Otherwise, the arguments carry through for analyses similar to hers.

2.1.1 Rivero's facts and interpretation. Let us examine some of Rivero's facts and her interpretation of them. She considers sentences like (her example (2a-b))²

- (2) a. Los corredores no creen que el belga ganara la carrera. (SUBJ)
b. Los corredores no creen que el belga ganó la carrera. (IND)

'The runners don't believe that the Belgian won the race.'

Rivero interprets these sentences as follows:

(...) In (2a) there is no presupposition on the part of the speaker about the truth of the complement. The speaker has a neutral attitude and simply reports what the runners believe. In (2b) the speaker presupposes that the complement is true, that is, that the Belgian did truly win the race. In other words, the speaker has a positive attitude and assumes that the action to which the complement is referring has occurred. The Indicative denotes certainty while the Subjunctive does not. [Emphasis added--TNO.] [p. 307]

This interpretation is only partially correct, and the generalization is wrong. Let us examine sentences (3), where the higher subject is yo 'I'; if the speaker and the subject of the matrix sentence are identical any "presupposition" should be transparent.

- (3) a. Yo no creo que Miguel vendiera su casa. (SUBJ)
b. Yo no creo que Miguel vendió su casa. (IND)

'I don't believe that Miguel sold his home.'

These sentences are synonymous in that in both instances the speaker takes the complement to be false (or unreal), i.e. that the action to which the complement refers has not occurred, no matter whether the complement verb is in the Indicative (as in (3b)), or in the Subjunctive (as in (3a)). The use of the Indicative in (3b) weighs against Rivero's correlation of this mood with "positive presupposition"; it also weighs against analyses based on "reality".

Let us re-examine the sentences in (2) in the light of the sentences in (3). For Rivero (2a) and (2b) are entirely different in terms of "presupposition" from the speaker's point of view. Her interpretation is misleading, since it is the case that neither (2a) nor (2b) is transparent for the speaker's attitude, i.e. in either case the speaker might or might not "presuppose" that "the Belgian won the race". The speaker simply reports the attitude of the higher subject regarding the truth of the event expressed in the complement, just as in (3a-b) the speaker expresses his attitude regarding the truth of the complement (the complement is either false or doubtful for the speaker). Both (2a) and (2b) can be completed with an utterance like y yo tampoco 'neither do I', with which the speaker expresses his rejection of the truth of the complement, thus showing that he does not presuppose its truth. Also, both (2a) and (2b) can be completed with an utterance like pero yo sí 'but I do (believe)', with which the speaker expresses that he believes the complement

to be true. If it were the case that the Indicative correlated with "positive presupposition of truth", yo tampoco should be ruled out in (2b). And if the Subjunctive correlated with "no presupposition" or "neutral attitude", pero yo sí should be ruled out in (2a). But they are not. This shows that Rivero's claim is incorrect.

2.1.2 Question-type sentences. For the sake of completeness, let us look further into Rivero's claim, which she extends to question-type sentences. (Her example (4a-b).)

(4) a. ¿Cree Ud. que sea verdad? (SUBJ)

b. ¿Cree Ud. que es verdad? (IND)

'Do you believe it's true?'

Since (4) is difficult to interpret in isolation, consider a context like the following exchange between speakers A and B:

(5) A. Muchas personas juran que han visto platillos voladores.

'Many people swear they've seen flying-saucers.'

B. (4) a. ¿Cree Ud. que sea verdad?

b. ¿Cree Ud. que es verdad?

Speaker B could complete either (a) or (b) with porque yo no creo esas historias 'because I don't believe those stories', thus revealing that he does not believe in the truth of the claim reported by speaker A. This clearly shows that in this case the Indicative does not correlate with "positive

presupposition of truth", nor does the Subjunctive correlate with "neutral attitude".

Nevertheless there is some reason to believe that the Subjunctive, in questions of this type, conveys a certain degree of doubt (and also expresses a neutral attitude toward the truth of the complement), on the part of the speaker.

(6) a. ¿Tú crees que yo esté loco? (SUBJ)

b. ¿Tú crees que yo estoy loco? (IND)

'Do you think I'm crazy?'

In (6a), where the Subjunctive is used, the speaker might have thought of the possibility that something is wrong with his mind (because he might have experienced certain symptoms, or because someone has told him that he is behaving strangely, etc.). The speaker's attitude is one of uncertainty; he probably expects that his interlocutor could resolve his doubts. In (6b), where the Indicative is used, it seems to me that the speaker is in no way "presupposing" that he is in fact crazy; quite on the contrary, he believes (or wants to convince himself) that he is as sane as the sanest, and is reacting against someone else's (real or hypothetical) belief that he is crazy. He probably expects no answer, or, perhaps, that his interlocutor will rush to say, No, hombre, yo no he dicho eso! 'No, man, I haven't said that!' Sentence (6b) is emphatic by nature, which would explain why it is usually uttered with a special intonation contour and in a pitch higher than normal.

This interpretation, however, is not the only possible one. In fact, in most cases where the Indicative and the Subjunctive can both occur in questions there seems not to be radical difference in reading correlated with the mood alternation.

(7) a. ¿Tú crees que Marta venga mañana? (SUBJ)

b. ¿Tú crees que Marta viene mañana? (IND)

'Do you think Marta is coming tomorrow?'

Each of these sentences conveys a meaning of doubt (or simply neutrality) on the part of the speaker. Also, in each case the speaker might believe that the complement is false. These interpretations would read, respectively, 'Will Marta come, or not?' and 'I'm sure Marta will not come, what do you think?'. The only reading I do not obtain from either sentence is 'I'm sure Marta will come, what do you think?', which according to Rivero, would be associated with the Indicative. If my perception of the meaning is correct, as I assume, then Rivero's claim must be incorrect.

2.1.3 Weakening of the claim. Rivero herself was aware that her generalization was inaccurate; she states:

(...)Although the Subjunctive has been associated, in this discussion, with a neutral attitude as far as presuppositions are concerned, this has been a coincidence and at no time have we stated that the Subjunctive implies in an automatic way a 'neutral presupposition' or no presupposition. There are subjunctive structures which presuppose the truth of the complement. [p. 329]

In brief; Rivero's claim is weakened to such a point that she concludes: "the Subjunctive of an embedded clause may not be associated with a predetermined type of presupposition, and an indicative complementizer need not be associated with the presupposition that the complement is true" [p. 329].

With this weakening of her claim, her theory is left in the air, because at no time does she propose an alternative analysis.

2.1.4 Closing remarks about Rivero's analysis. There are other problems with Rivero [1971]. First, the arguments throughout the lengthy study in which she claims that "the indicative complementizer is correlated with positive presupposition about the truth of the complement, and the Subjunctive implies a neutral attitude" (cf. her Abstract, p. 305) are contradicted by the statements quoted above. Moreover, she claims that there is a deep correlation between these "presuppositions" underlying the mood distinction and certain transformations, such as Neg-raising, Equi-NP deletion, etc., also contradicted by the statements above. Second, Rivero does not define her notion of presupposition (except by saying that it correlates with positive truth of the complement). Apparently her idea of presupposition vaguely includes "logical presupposition" as defined in Keenan [1971], and also the idea of "belief" in the truth of the complement; but she fails to put these notions in the proper perspective. Third, her data is too narrow,

essentially restricted to sentences containing matrix verbs of "opinion" (e.g. (no) creer 'to (not) believe', and parecer 'to seem'/'to look like'). Of course, Rivero was interested in "explaining" the mood alternation in only this type of sentence; that is why this review has been confined to her own data; but even with that restriction, Rivero's hypothesis cannot explain the mood alternation even in those cases which it is supposed to explain.

2.2 Hooper [1972], Terrell and Hooper [1972],³ and Terrell [1974] complement each other. These papers, in turn, constitute, to a great extent, an attempt to integrate the most insightful traditional-and-modern semantic analyses of the Spanish mood alternations in general, and of these alternations in noun clauses in particular. This is why I will examine these papers in great detail. In showing them to be inaccurate or inadequate in their account of the Spanish mood alternations, other analyses, less richly developed but based on the same set of semantic notions, will also be shown to be inadequate.

2.2.1 Rationale and system. Terrell and Hooper [1972] state the rationale behind their analysis in the following way:

The speaker makes certain decisions about the information he wishes to convey. First, does he presuppose the sentence to be true? If so, does he wish to say a mental act occurred in regard to the sentence, or does he want to make a subjective comment about it? If the proposition is not presupposed to be true, does he

wish to assert it, doubt its possible varacity, or try to influence it to happen? These basic semantic factors, then, are responsible for the choice of a matrix and the syntactic patterns of the sentence (which includes more than just a subjunctive-indicative contrast...)" [p. 21]

This statement captures rather adequately the mental operations underlying a speech act.⁴ According to this rationale, Terrell and Hooper propose that the mood alternation in (independent and) noun clauses can be explained in terms of a classificatory system making use of semantic notions which are assumed to operate, in complex sentences, both on complements and matrices. The complement and the matrix are required to be matched in terms of their semantic notions. This system is represented by Terrell and Hooper in their chart (29), which is reproduced here as (8).

(8)	<u>Semantic notion</u>	<u>Class</u>	<u>Mood</u>
	Assertion	(1) Assertion	Ind
		(2) Report	Ind
	Presupposition	(3) Mental Act	Ind
		(4) Comment	Subj
	Neither	(5) Doubt	Subj
		(6) Imperative	Subj

There are in this system three abstract semantic notions: assertion, presupposition, and nonassertion-nonpresupposition (represented in the chart as Neither). Each of these notions underlies two classes of sentences or matrices; and each class is uniquely correlated with one or the other mood.

2.2.2 Similarities to other analyses. Before entering into the details and critique of Terrell and Hooper's analysis, I would like to point out some of the features it has in common with other analyses.

2.2.2.1 Lenz [1925] adopts the logical classification of propositions into assertive, problematic, and apodictic. This classification is identical with the notions included in Terrell and Hooper as assertion, nonassertion-nonpresupposition, and presupposition, respectively.

For Lenz [p. 434] the mood of the proposition is governed by the thought of the whole "period" (i.e. the whole sentence), and not only by the "conjunction" (i.e. the complementizer). This is essentially the position expressed in Terrell and Hooper's rationale quoted above. Lenz [footnote p. 538] claims that the mood is chosen in the following way: The indicative in the declaration, the Subjunctive (obligatorily) in the wish, and either the Indicative or the Subjunctive in the doubt. Declaration seems to be intended in the sense of Terrell and Hooper's assertion and report (classes (1) and (2)); wish is essentially similar to their class (6), i.e. Imperative; and doubt is identical to their class (5), i.e. doubt, except that while Lenz allows for the Indicative and the Subjunctive in this case, Terrell and Hooper only accept (or predict) the Subjunctive. Terrell and Hooper's classes (3) and (4) are not matched in Lenz [1925].

2.2.2.2 Togeby [1953] analyzes the mood alternation in noun clauses as dependent on the matrix elements ("racines verbales", "racines de substantifs", etc.). This is identical with other analyses such as Stockwell et al. [1965], Bello [1925], Rojas [1969].

Although Terrell and Hooper explicitly reject this kind of approach, their requirement that the noun clause be semantically matched to the matrix (cf. T&H, p. 16) amounts exactly to "predicting" the mood of the noun clause in terms of the matrix. The two types of analysis appear to be simply notational variants. In the "superordinate" analysis [Togeby 1953, etc.], the semantic content of the matrix is extended to the noun clause. In Terrell and Hooper's view the matrix and the noun clause must be assigned identical notions in their (deep) semantic representations. The results are identical since both in the "superordinate" analysis and in Terrell and Hooper's analysis the matrix verbs are classified according to identical semantic criteria and have identical consequences in the choice of mood.

Going back to Togeby [1953], he recognizes that

Parfois c'est le subjonctif seul qui exprime la suspension d'affirmation, (...) Le Subjonctif exprime que la proposition complétive en fonction de sujet n'est pas une communication en soi, mais un point de départ d'une réflexion ou d'une évaluation. On voit que les racines qu'on dirait régir les propositions complétives n'ont pas d'influence. Et quand l'indicatif apparaît ce n'est pas pour l'influence du verbe, mais pour exprimer une nuance affirmative. [p. 48]

This resembles Hooper [1972], where it is claimed that the Indicative correlates with the notion of assertion, and the Subjunctive with lack of assertion. This is also the basic assumption in Terrell and Hooper [1972], except that in this latter paper more semantic factors have been added to the analysis.

Togeby's analysis (quoted above) differs from Terrell and Hooper [1972] in that while Togeby allows for the Indicative in presupposed propositions functioning as subjects, Terrell and Hooper exclude it.

2.2.2.3 Seco [1960:209-210] claims that the Object sentence (i.e. the noun clause functioning as object of a matrix sentence) will take an indicative verb form when it expresses objectivity without subjective appreciation, as a real and certain thing which does not admit hesitation; and that this occurs when in the main sentence there are verbs of the mind, language, and sense, such as pensar 'think', juzgar 'judge', creer 'believe', recordar 'remember', decir 'say'/'tell', responder 'answer', saber 'know', sentir 'feel', temer 'fear', etc. The subordinate sentence, according to Seco, takes a subjunctive verb form whenever the verb of the subordinating sentence expresses the event with subjective appreciation, as a doubtful thing, or something which is not in the speaker's power to decide; such is the case with verbs of the mind when the subordinate sentence is dubitative or optative, and with verbs of will in general, such as querer 'want', desear

'wish', mandar 'command', exigir 'demand', resolver 'decide', acordar 'agree'/'pact', etc.

An identical position is taken in Coste and Redondo [1965]:

L'indicatif est le mode de l'OBJECTIVITÉ. Il sert à constater une vérité objective, à affirmer la réalité d'un fait, sans qu'interviennent les sentiments de la personne considérée. Le subjonctif, en revanche, est le mode de la SUBJECTIVITÉ ou de l'EVENTUALITÉ. Il sert donc soit à énoncer une vérité subjective, liée à la volonté ou à l'affectivité de la personne considérée, soit à présenter un fait éventuel. Le choix entre les deux modes dépend par conséquent de la nature et de la forme du verbe principal ainsi que de la nature du fait exprimé dans la principale et dans la subordonnée. [p. 435]

These analyses by Seco and Coste and Redondo are perfectly comparable with Terrell and Hooper [1972]. Although the former are not as detailed as the latter, their notion of objectivity seems to cover classes (1)-(3) in Terrell and Hooper, and their notion of subjectivity seems to cover classes (4)-(6) in Terrell and Hooper. It might be the case that if their parameters were precisely defined the objectivity/subjectivity opposition could have some advantages over Terrell and Hooper [1972].

2.2.2.4 Within a transformational framework, Lozano [1972] proposes that underlying the subjunctive verb forms are the features [+ Optative] and [+/- Dubitative]; the former necessitates subjunctives and is related to semantic characteristics of volition, intent, persuasion or obligation; the latter may or may not necessitate subjunctives and is

related to semantic characteristics of doubt, unreality, and probability (the allowed alternation--IND/SUBJ--with [+/- Dubitative] is related to the negation of the matrix, which is very similar to some of Stockwell et al.'s classes).

According to Lozano, these feature specifications are part of the description of "morphemes" (i.e. lexical items). Apparently, in Lozano's analysis the matrix sentence governs the mood of the noun clause, or the specifications of both have to be matched (just as in Terrell and Hooper).

Lozano's analysis (specially aimed at accounting for the occurrence of the Subjunctive) makes reference to semantic notions subsumed in Terrell and Hooper's system under classes (5) and (6). Both analyses are, then, comparable, although Lozano's analysis is rather vague (e.g. it is difficult to see exactly what [- Dubitative] would correlate with; it might include both assertion and presupposition, but this is not defined in Lozano [1972]).

2.2.2.5 Lakoff [1968] deals with Latin complementation; but she suggests that the Subjunctive in Latin (and Spanish) is triggered by an abstract verb (abstract verbs have semantic and syntactic consequences but need not have phonological shape), e.g. [IMPER], [LIC], etc. ([IMPER] stands for an abstract verb of commanding, and [LIC] stands for an abstract verb of permission).

I see no great difference (except for formalization) between abstract verbs in the Lakovian analysis, and semantic

notions like those proposed by Terrell and Hooper, as far as the mood alternations are concerned.

2.2.2.6 The analyses outlined above are simply samples of the "diverse" kinds of "explanations" that have been proposed for the Spanish mood alternations. There are of course, many more (e.g. Real Academia [1924], Ramsey [1956], Spaulding [1952], Hadlich [1967], Gili y Gaya [1961], etc.), but they can be subsumed under the analysis of Terrell and Hooper [1972] in one way or another, just as the samples cited in the preceding sections can.

2.2.3 Assertion-nonassertion. Let us return now to Terrell and Hooper. Terrell and Hooper's hypothesis for a generalization of the mood distinction in Spanish is that "in independent and noun clauses the indicative is associated with assertion while the subjunctive is associated with non-assertion" [p. 8] (emphasis added--TNO); the only exception they point out is that of their class (3), i.e. "Mental Act", which is taken to be semantically presupposed, but which behaves syntactically as assertions do (it takes an indicative verb form).

Terrell and Hooper point out that the semantic notion of presupposition is important for embedded clauses. They also note that presupposition that a proposition is true and assertion that it is true are not equivalent; the negation of the whole sentence does not affect the truth of the embedded

presupposed proposition, but it does affect the truth of the embedded assertion.

Terrell and Hooper follow the Kiparskys [1968] in the division of matrices into factive, which require presupposed complements, and nonfactive, which do not; and also in the claim that the phrase the fact that is used only with complements that are presupposed to be true. Terrell and Hooper claim that both of these points hold for Spanish.

The distinctions between assertion and presupposition, and between factive and nonfactive matrices are intuitively correct, and no further comments seem to be necessary. But there are several difficulties with their hypothesis, explored below.

2.2.4 Assertion. Hooper [1972] states:

Most simple declarative sentences make assertions, whether the verb is in the past, present, or future time, and whether or not the sentence is negated. (This does not mean that the proposition being asserted is indeed true, nor does it mean that it is presupposed; it means simply that its truth is asserted). [p. 8]

According to Terrell and Hooper [1972], since most simple declarative sentences are assertions they use the indicative mood. Their claim is that "any sentence which is an assertion must contain an indicative verb form" [p. 8]. They hypothesize that in independent and noun clauses the indicative is associated with assertion while the subjunctive is associated with nonassertion [p. 8]. The only exception to this claim is their Class (3), Mental Act, where the Indicative is associated with presupposition.

2.2.4.1 Assertion and noun clauses. Terrell and Hooper [p. 6] contend that the speaker may qualify an assertion by making it a complement to a certain type of matrix phrase--which they call assertive matrices--ranging in meaning from strong insistence, as in es seguro 'it is sure', to weak belief as in me parece 'it seems to me'. [Their example (17).]

(9) Me parece que usted debe (de) quedarse aquí. (IND)

'It seems to me that you should stay here.'

This example is rather unconvincing for their analysis, since the sentence is equally grammatical, and also has a reading of "weak belief" if the Subjunctive is used, as in (9').

(9') Me parece que usted debiera (de) quedarse aquí. (SUBJ)

'It seems to me that you should stay here.'

Terrell and Hooper apparently were unaware that most "assertive" matrix phrases can co-occur with either indicative or subjunctive complements in some dialects (like mine). One instance is the matrix phrase es seguro 'it is sure', which according to Terrell and Hooper expresses strong insistence.

(10) a. Es seguro que Pedro ya vino. (IND)

b. Es seguro que Pedro ya haya venido. (SUBJ)

'It is sure that Pedro came/has come already.'

This is also true of the class of assertive matrices (Class IV) set up in Hooper [1972], which, she claims, take indicative complements: creer 'to believe', pensar 'to think', saber 'to know', estar seguro 'to be sure', which take object complements; and ser verdad 'to be true', ser cierto 'to be certain', ser evidente 'to be evident', which take subject complements.

(11) a. Creo que Carmen salió. (IND)

b. Creo que Carmen haya salido. (SUBJ)

'I believe Carmen (has) left.'

(12) a. Pensaba que nuestro equipo había ganado. (IND)

b. Pensaba que nuestro equipo hubiera ganado. (SUBJ)

'I thought that our team had won.'

(13) a. Es cierto que se fué. (IND)

b. Es cierto que se haya ido. (SUBJ)

'It's true that he (has) left.'

Of course, it might be claimed that the mood of the complement signals different readings: the indicative is an assertion, and the subjunctive signals doubt; this is not what is claimed by Hooper, but rather that the complements of assertive matrices must be assertions, since matrix and noun clauses are semantically paired in this analysis.

The fact is that verbs like creer, pensar, parecer and the like, are not necessarily assertive (in Hooper's sense).

One way to make these verbs assertive is to modify them with the emphatic sí 'do', but even so the complement can be either Indicative or Subjunctive.

(14) a. Yo sí creo que Dios existe. (IND)

b. Yo sí creo que Dios exista. (SUBJ)

'I do believe that God exists.'

Thus, the notion of assertion associated with the Indicative and nonassertion associated with the Subjunctive fails in these cases with "assertive" matrices.

2.2.4.1.1 Terrell and Hooper (pp. 7-8) set up another kind of indirect assertion: reported or cited, like the complements to verbs such as decir 'to say', leer 'to read', contestar 'to answer' and contar 'to tell', which describe the manner in which the asserted information was conveyed. According to Terrell and Hooper, even when the subject of the matrix sentence is the first person singular, the complement to this type of matrix is still a reported assertion. (Their example (19).)

(15) Le conté que María no quería jugar tenis.

'I told him that María didn't want to play tennis.'

They claim that "since the matrix phrase merely tells how the assertion was conveyed, their negation does not deny the assertion."⁵ (Their example (20).)

(16) No me contó que usted había terminado su trabajo.

'He didn't tell me that you had finished your work.'

Terrell and Hooper contend that the difference in the effect of negation on these two types of assertive matrices (i.e. the ones that express belief and the ones that cite or report) is a direct consequence of their difference in meaning. Examples like (15) and (16), they claim, show clearly that any sentence which is an assertion must contain an indicative verb form.

That these two types of matrices are semantically different, I do not dispute. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the complements in (15) and (16) are asserted. Paul Schachter has pointed out to me (personal communication) that sentences like these "do not assert the complement itself, but rather the reporting (or not) of the complement." It might be the case that (in (15)) the complement contains an "indirect" version of a statement (or information) provided by the higher subject (the speaker in this case) at some previous time; but this does not mean that in (15) the complement is asserted. Also in (16) there is no way to claim that the complement is asserted; the expression of the complement cannot be attributed to the subject of the higher sentence since the negation of the matrix sentence denies the relation between the higher subject and the expression of the noun clause; the complement may be attributed to speakers other than the higher subject, but, again, this does not mean that the noun clause in (16) is asserted.

If my claim is correct, then the Indicative in these cases has nothing to do with the semantic notion of assertion.

Now, if Terrell and Hooper insist that the complement in (16) is an assertion, their claim that any assertion must contain an indicative verb form can be proven wrong since sentences with negative reporting matrices can also take subjunctive complements.

(17) No le conté que María no quisiera jugar tenis. (SUBJ)

'I didn't tell him that Maria didn't want to play tennis.'

(18) No me contó que tú te hubieras graduado. (SUBJ)

'He didn't tell me that you had graduated.'

In brief, the examples discussed above indicate that Terrell and Hooper's analysis fails in two ways: (a) the Indicative cannot be associated uniquely with the notion of assertion; and (b) the matrix sentence and the noun clause need not be paired in terms of their semantic notions, i.e. the notion of assertion may underlie the matrix verb, but need not underlie the noun clause.

2.2.4.2 Other analysis, like Stockwell et al. [1965], Bello [1925], Togeby [1953], set up verb classes in terms very similar to those used by Hooper [1972]. Matrix verbs require either one mood or the other, or may allow for both of them in the complements. Obviously, it would be simple for these approaches to claim that verbs are marked in the

lexicon as to the mood their noun clauses could take, just as Rojas [1969] does; thus, whenever new facts are uncovered (as above), the lexical specification can be adjusted. This type of approach could be useful, indeed, but it does not explain at all the nature of the mood alternation. I believe that such analyses are looking at the wrong end of the phenomenon, i.e. they pay too much attention to the matrix and not enough to the semantics of the noun clauses.

2.2.5 Nonassertion

2.2.5.1 Imperative. Hooper [1972] claims that a command can never be an assertion, and that since this is so it is not surprising to find that (formal) commands in Spanish use the subjunctive form of the verb. The same position is adopted in Terrell and Hooper [1972].

Terrell and Hooper were evidently unaware that although the Subjunctive is the unmarked mood in independent sentences expressing (noncolloquial) commands, and in embedded clauses expressing commanded events, the Indicative is also possible both in independent and in embedded sentences with an imperative reading. The Indicative renders the command emphatic. This choice occurs freely in independent imperative sentences, but it is extremely restricted in embedded sentences. Its use tends to be "politely" avoided because of its strong connotation of "superauthority". But it is allowed by the grammar of Spanish.

The Indicative version of commands can occur in sentences containing the matrix verbs ordenar, disponer 'to order', insistir en 'to insist', decidir 'to decide', and decir 'to tell'.

(19) Yo ordené que tú te vas! (IND)

'I ordered you to leave!'

These facts about commands are extremely damaging for analyses in which the Indicative is correlated with assertion of truth (or with reality), unless the notion of assertion is attributed to imperative sentences as well; but this would weaken the claim considerably, since we would have no unique semantic notions to associate mood with, and Terrell and Hooper claim that imperatives are definitely not assertions. One way out would be to take these facts as exceptions; but if we keep adding exceptions upon exceptions we will soon have to give up Terrell and Hooper's system (as it stands) and look for another explanation. And this is exactly what must be done in the light of my discussion thus far, and of the facts to be taken up in the following sections.

2.2.5.2 Doubt. Terrell and Hooper note that another type of nonassertion is found in sentences that express doubt about the validity of a proposition; and this is normally done by embedding the proposition under a suitable matrix verb such as dudar 'to doubt', negar 'to deny', or a negative assertive matrix of opinion like no parece 'it doesn't seem',

no creer 'to not believe', etc. (negation of matrices of "opinion" turns them into matrices of "doubt").

This description greatly resembles Stockwell et al. [1965], with the difference that while Terrell and Hooper embed a doubted proposition under a matrix verb expressing doubt, in Stockwell et al. the matrix verbs of certain classes (established on semantic grounds similar to those mentioned in Terrell and Hooper's description) require that the embedded clause take the Subjunctive. The result, as can be seen, is identical, since both analyses predict the Subjunctive in the embedded clause. (T&H examples (25) and (26).)

(20) Dudo que hayan terminado ya. (SUBJ)

'I doubt that they have finished already.'

(21) Es posible que hayan terminado ya. (SUBJ)

'It is possible that they have finished already.'

I agree that the doubted clause commonly takes a subjunctive verb form when embedded; but this is not the only possibility, and the Indicative is also acceptable:

(22) a. Pedro niega que él hubiera matado a Oscar. (SUBJ)

b. Pedro niega que él mató a Oscar. (IND)

'Pedro denies that he killed Oscar.'

(23) a. María todavía duda que ella se hubiera ganado el primer premio. (SUBJ)

b. María todavía duda que ella se ganó el primer premio. (IND)

'María still doubts that she won first prize.'

(24) a. Boris no cree que Dios exista. (SUBJ)

b. Boris no cree que Dios existe. (IND)

'Boris does not believe that God exists.'

Sentences (22) to (24) show that the mood alternation is possible in complements to the matrices dudar, negar, and no creer (which are verbs that express an attitude toward the truth of the complement). In either case (Indicative or Subjunctive complements) the validity of the noun clause is doubted by the higher subject.

There are certain semantic subtleties involved in the sentences above: first, for the subject of the matrix sentence the complement, regardless of its mood, is either doubted or plainly false; second, the speaker, no matter which mood he chooses in the complement, may believe that it is true; third, the complements of the (b) sentences (but not those of the (a) sentences) can be interpreted as "quotations" of statements to which the higher subject is reacting.

In any event, it becomes apparent from the examples above, that a vague notion of doubt about the validity of a proposition is not enough to cause the complement verb to take the Subjunctive only. As far as I know, it was Lenz [1925] who first noticed that either the Indicative or the Subjunctive was allowed "in the doubt" (i.e. in a doubted clause).

The examples in (22) to (24), then, point out the inaccuracy of Terrell and Hooper's system in associating in a

unique way the notion of doubt with the Subjunctive. The same inaccuracy is found in analyses that predict only the Subjunctive in complements to matrix verbs expressing doubt.

2.2.5.3 Presupposition (nonassertion)

2.2.5.3.1 Comment. Terrell and Hooper distinguish two types of comments: (i) "value judgment", as a reaction to a proposition (their example (27)).

(25) Es una lástima (bueno, malo, interesante, etc.) que María no haya podido terminar a tiempo. (SUBJ)

'It's a shame (good, bad, interesting, etc.) that Maria hasn't been able to finish on time.'

and (ii) "subjective comment" (the subject of the matrix sentence is affected psychologically or physically by the event of the proposition). (Their example (28).)

(26) Me alegro de que María haya podido terminar a tiempo. (SUBJ)

'I'm happy that Maria was able to finish on time.'

In both cases, Terrell and Hooper note, the speaker must presuppose the proposition to be a true statement, but the proposition is commented upon, not asserted; thus the subjunctive forms are used.

In dialects like mine the proposition about which a subjective comment is made can take either indicative or subjunctive verb forms, as in (27) and (28).

- (27) a. Me enfureció que me insultaron. (IND)
b. Me enfureció que me insultaran. (SUBJ)

'It enraged me that they insulted me.'

- (28) a. Me encanta que llegaste a tiempo. (IND)
b. Me encanta que hayas llegado a tiempo. (SUBJ)

'I'm delighted that you came on time.'

This fact is not ignored by Terrell and Hooper, who say that it is common for some speakers to use the indicative in all types of presupposed complements. This statement is entirely correct, as far as I know. However, no explanation is provided for this fact; they simply predict that if the system changes the Indicative will be associated with both assertion and presupposition. The use of the Indicative in these types of presupposition is (synchronically) unexpected in Terrell and Hooper's system, where only the Subjunctive is possible. Apparently, then, Terrell and Hooper's system is designed to describe only certain dialects of Spanish.

2.2.5.3.2 Mental act. This notion refers to matrix phrases such as darse cuenta 'to realize', aprender 'to learn', and tomar en consideración 'to take into consideration', which--Terrell and Hooper explain--describe a mental act that takes place in regard to (but are not caused by) the proposition in the complement. Terrell and Hooper point out that although the complement to the matrices of the mental act is not asserted, it nevertheless carries an

indicative verb form. The complements to this kind of matrices are exceptions to the general principle that asserted complements are in the Indicative while the nonasserted complements are in the Subjunctive.

Terrell and Hooper contend that these exceptions are not wholly anomalous, because they are more similar to assertions than any other (nonassertive) complements they have described.

Terrell [1974] addresses herself to this particular problem, and introduces some modifications to Terrell and Hooper [1972]. Let us examine these modifications and see if they fare any better.

2.2.5.3.2.1 Terrell [1974] follows Karttunen [1971] and Hooper [1974] in recognizing two kinds of presupposition: weak and strong. In sentences with strong presupposition, the complement is accepted as true under any conditions; with complements only weakly presupposed, it is possible to construct sentences in which the truth of the complement cannot be inferred. An example of "strong presupposition" can be found in sentences like (Terrell's (5)):

- (29) No me sorprende el hecho de que hayan podido hacer el viaje sino que hayan podido quedarse allí por tanto tiempo. (SUBJ)

'It doesn't surprise me that they were able to take the trip, but rather that they were able to stay so long.'

An example of "weak presupposition" can be found in sentences like (Terrell's (6)):

- (30) No supe que se había cancelado el vuelo sino que todavía no había llegado. (IND)

'I didn't find out that the flight had been cancelled, only that it hadn't arrived.'

Terrell explains that even in contrastive situations the complement in (29) remains presupposed; in (30), however, the proposition may or may not be presupposed. According to this criterion (and other that she discusses at length in her paper) she claims that the notion of weak presupposition is compatible with the notion of assertion, thus departing from the original statement in Terrell and Hooper [1972:5], where the notions of assertion and presupposition, in general, were felt to be mutually exclusive.

Terrell [1974:9] states that the indicative is used in cases of assertion and weak presupposition, and the subjunctive in cases of nonassertion, including strong presupposition. Since I do not dispute that there are at least two kinds of presupposition, nor reject the compatibility of assertion and presupposition, I will not examine Terrell's evidence in support of that claim. But what I do disagree with is the statement underlined above, simply because it is inaccurate. Notice that sentences (31) to (35) contain "strong presuppositions" in their complements. According to Terrell [1974] these complements should be subjunctive, but

it is the case that the Indicative is perfectly natural there.

- (31) El hecho de que los ríos se secaron trajo muchos problemas a la economía. (IND)

'The fact that the rivers dried up brought many problems to the economy.'

- (32) Qué bueno que viniste. (IND)

'How good that you came.'

- (33) Todos sabemos que la tierra no es cuadrada. (IND)

'All of us know that Earth is not square.'

- (34) Nadie se dió cuenta de que tú y yo habíamos salido. (IND)

'Nobody noticed that you and I had left.'

- (35) No me sorprende el hecho de que Nixon renunció sino que no lo hizo antes. (IND)

'I'm not surprised at the fact that Nixon quit, but rather that he didn't do it before.'

Sentences (31) to (35), then, show that Terrell [1974] does not provide an accurate explanation of the mood alteration, either..

Let us go back to Terrell and Hooper [1972].

2.2.5.3.2.2 In their system, the Indicative is required in complements to "mental act" matrices. This is not the only possibility, however, since there are sentences like (36), where either the Indicative or the Subjunctive is possible in the complement.

- (36) a. El juez se dió cuenta de que el acusado había mentido, pero no le dió importancia al hecho. (IND)
- b. El juez se dió cuenta de que el acusado hubiera mentido, pero no le dió importancia al hecho. (SUBJ)
- 'The judge realized that the defendant had lied, but he gave no importance to the fact.'

Apparently the choice of the Subjunctive in (36b) involves more than the simple notion of mental act. It seems to me that (36b) is a legitimate choice if the sentence is used after someone has made the remark that the judge did not realize that the defendant had lied. Also (36b) implies that the event expressed in the complement lacks importance (either for the speaker or for the subject of the "mental act"). All in all, the two sentences are synonymous as far as logical presupposition is concerned; in both cases the complement is true.

The mood alternation is still more natural in sentences with negated "mental act" matrices.

- (37) a. No tuvo en cuenta que los dos necesitábamos dinero. (IND)
- b. No tuvo en cuenta que los dos necesitáramos dinero. (SUBJ)
- 'He didn't take into consideration that both of us needed money.'

Obviously, Terrell and Hooper [1972] were unaware of the fact that the Subjunctive was possible in complements to "mental act" matrices, which could fit nicely into their non-assertion class. Nevertheless, the Indicative continues to

be an "exception" both for Terrell and Hooper [1972], and for Terrell [1974]--the complements in (36) and (37) are instances of "strong presupposition" and should take only subjunctive verb forms, according to Terrell [1974].

2.2.6 Concluding remarks. Terrell and Hooper [1972] provide evidence for their semantic notions and classes; but I will not examine it in this review. Suffice it to say that I do not disagree that these semantic notions and classes are important in language in general; but it has been shown in this study that the choice of mood does not depend uniquely on them.

In the preceding sections their system and data were examined in some detail, and it was found that Terrell and Hooper (and other linguists as well) have ignored certain mood alternations that prove to be extremely damaging for their analyses. In the following section even more damaging data will be examined; these facts were also ignored by Terrell and/or Hooper, and have been ignored by most linguists dealing with the Spanish mood distinction.

2.2.7 Other facts commonly left out. There are in Spanish expressions like (i) aparentar 'to pretend', fingir 'to feign', hacerse el que 'to pretend', simular 'to simulate'; (ii) inventar 'to make up', meter el cuento (de) 'to make believe', (es) mentira/falso 'it is a lie/false'; (iii) dizque--usually analyzed as a reduction of dicen que 'they say'/'it is said'.

These expressions qualify the complement in such a way that either it is assumed to be false, or strongly doubted. The complement is false if qualified by (i) and (ii); doubted if qualified by dizque (i.e. (iii)).

All of these expressions--let us call them "deceptive" matrices--take complements with indicative verbs; some of them can also take subjunctive complements, but some can not.

This list is miscellaneous from other syntactic points of view. For instance, aparentar requires that its subject be correferential with the subject of the complement, while inventar does not; but these facts are irrelevant for the present purposes.

Consider the following examples:

- (38) El obrero { simula } que { está } trabajando. (IND)
 { se hace el } { ?esté } (SUBJ)
 { estuviera } (SUBJ)

'The worker pretends he is working.'

- (39) Es { mentira } que Alicia se { casó. } (IND)
 { falso } { haya casado. } (SUBJ)
 { hubiera casado. } (SUBJ)

'It is a lie/false that Alicia got married.'

- (40) Dizque ya { terminó } la guerra. (IND)
 { *terminara } (SUBJ)
 { *haya terminado } (SUBJ)

'They say the war is over.'

These sentences are all different from one another. (38) describes a deceptive act, (39) qualifies the information contained in the complement as false, and (40) qualifies the information provided in the complement as doubtful (it also has a sarcastic reading).

If we were to explain the occurrence of either mood in terms of Terrell and Hooper's system, there would be no difficulty in explaining the Subjunctive in the preceding strings as nonassertions. Nevertheless, the occurrence of the Indicative would be left unexplained: first, in (38) the complement can in no way be claimed to be an assertion of truth either from the speaker's point of view (since the complement is false for him), or from the subject's point of view (since assertions are verbal, not enactive, and the complement describes a deceptive act not a deceptive statement); second, in (39) the matrix is the speaker's evaluation of the truth of the complement; it seems to be the case that the Indicative constitutes an assertion, a "reported assertion" (the speaker contends that an assertion made by someone else and "quoted" by him is false); this interpretation is entirely correct; however, since in Terrell and Hooper's system the complement must be paired with the semantic notion expressed by the matrix, and in this case the matrix is one of "denial", only the Subjunctive will be expected in that analysis; third, in (40) the expression dizque casts doubt upon the validity of the information; thus, although

the complement can be interpreted as a "reported assertion", just as in (39), Terrell and Hooper's system cannot explain the occurrence of the Indicative because of its requirement that the complement be matched to the semantic notion expressed by the matrix, and since dizque signals doubt the proper mood for the complement should be the Subjunctive, but this is ruled out in Spanish in sentences like (40).⁶

These sentences falsify not only Terrell and Hooper's system, but also those analyses similar to it, especially those that associate the Indicative with the speaker's affirmation, or with the vague notions of reality, objectivity and [- Dubitative]. This difficulty was first noticed by Togeby [1953:53], who says that "Il est remarquable que l'indicatif soit aussi de règle après fingir où il s'agit d'une illusion."

2.2.8 Conclusion. The semantic notions of assertion and presupposition do play a role in Spanish, as evidenced by the standard tests on factivity: el hecho de que 'the fact that' can be inserted only in presupposed sentences, and the negation of the matrix does not affect the truth of a presupposed complement but it does affect the truth of the nonpresupposed complement.

Also, the different attitudes adopted by the speaker in regard with the proposition are very important in language, and Terrell and Hooper's rationale (Section 2.2.1) captures the essentials of these attitudes adequately. However, a

system like Terrell and Hooper's--neat as it looks--cannot account for the mood distinction in Spanish in a general way, since in many instances the Indicative can be used where Terrell and Hooper's system rejects it, or the Subjunctive can be used where it is not allowed in that system; and the alternations in these cases do not signal radical differences of meaning, but rather "stylistic" variations that seem to be controlled by other factors than the notions and classes set up in Terrell and Hooper's system.

Although Terrell and Hooper claim that the complement mood has a meaning of its own they follow the same procedure of other linguists (Bello [1925], Togeby [1953], Stockwell et al. [1965], etc.) in that they pay too much attention to the meaning of the matrix. Thus Terrell and Hooper end up "predicting" the mood of the complements from the semantic notions of the matrices in most instances; notice that they have "assertive matrices", "reporting matrices", "matrices that express doubt or denial", etc., and recognize that certain matrices shift to the opposite class when negated. All this machinery does make sense, of course, and has to be part of the description of the language; what seems to be mistaken is the claim that the choice of mood stands in a one to one correlation with the semantic notions of the matrix. (One might be tempted at this point to suggest that all that is necessary is to mark certain matrices in the lexicon as accepting both Indicative and Subjunctive complements. However,

this would do nothing to explain the nature of the mood alternation.)

The only case in which Terrell and Hooper [1972], and most linguists in general, assign the complement a reading of its own is in the analysis of "ambiguous matrices" such as insistir 'to insist' (this has not been examined in this review); but even then, Terrell and Hooper claim that the meaning of the matrix and the meaning of the complement must be matched. This is inaccurate; the so-called "ambiguous matrices" turn out to be "neutral" (as Togeby [1953] calls them), i.e. they happen to be able to co-occur with asserted, presupposed, or imperative embedded sentences, but there is nothing in their meaning that reveals that they have all or some of the properties of these semantic notions.

We can conclude that Terrell and Hooper's analysis, and all of the analyses related to it, cannot explain the choice of mood in Spanish noun clauses.

Let us now examine the analysis in Bull [1965].

2.3 Bull [1965]

Bull [1965] claims that the choice of mood (which he calls "Mode")

depends on two factors, linguistic structure and the Spaniard's way of organizing reality. In other words, the nature of the message and the manner of expressing it serve as joint cues for choice. [p. 175]

The choice of mood, in Bull's analysis, may or may not be significant (i.e. meaningful). It is significant only

when contrast is possible, and, for Bull, the Indicative and the Subjunctive stand in contrast almost exclusively in subordinate clauses. Otherwise the "mode" is syntactically governed (or "arbitrary").

The modal contrast can be significant, in Bull's analysis, in three formulae (out of seven he proposes). The one formula which is relevant for this review is: "There is a relationship between events". This formula refers to the relationship between a matrix sentence and a noun clause.

2.3.1 Experience-nonexperience. Bull claims that the contrast between the Indicative and the Subjunctive is based on the speaker's "experience" (or "knowledge") of the event versus "nonexperience" (or "anticipation", or "lack of positive knowledge"). This is supposed to capture the relation between the speaker and the event. Bull adds:

It is only one step from what has been experienced to what one may conclude from inference, circumstantial evidence, or simply blind faith. There are two possible conclusions. The speaker accepts the evidence as equivalent to actual experience or an equivalent to nonexperience. Each attitude is expressed overtly by the main clause and redundantly by the modal contrast in the subordinate clause. (Emphasis added--TNO.) [pp. 182-183]

The following examples are provided by Bull to illustrate his claim:

(41) a. Es evidente que han llegado. (IND)

'It's obvious that they have arrived.'

b. Es imposible que hayan llegado. (SUBJ)

'It's impossible that they have arrived.'

(42) a. Creo que han llegado. (IND)

'I think that they have arrived.'

b. No creo que hayan llegado. (SUBJ)

'I don't think that they have arrived.'

(43) a. Estoy seguro que han llegado. (IND)

'I'm sure that they have arrived.'

b. Dudo que hayan llegado. (SUBJ)

'I doubt that they have arrived.'

(44) a. Me imagino que han llegado. (IND)

'I imagine that they have arrived.'

b. No me imagino que hayan llegado. (SUBJ)

'I don't imagine that they have arrived.'

Bull adds that "there are times when the speaker, for lack of knowledge or evidence, can only vacillate between a negative or a positive conclusion. Under these conditions he may hedge in either direction by the appropriate choice of mood". The following examples are provided by Bull:

(45) a. Temo que han llegado. (IND)

b. Temo que hayan llegado. (SUBJ)

'I'm afraid that they have arrived.'

Bull claims that in (45a) the evidence is reasonably conclusive; in (45b) the evidence is inconclusive.

2.3.1.1 Put in these terms, Bull [1965], Rivero [1971], Terrell and Hooper [1972], and other analyses, are extremely similar. Bull's correlation of the Indicative with "experience" (or "positive knowledge", or "inference", etc.) is equivalent to Rivero's "positive presupposition of truth", to Terrell and Hooper's "assertion" and "weak presupposition", to Seco's "objective appreciation", to Coste and Redondo "objectivité", etc. The difference between Bull and the other analyses is that Bull's is less general, since he allows for syntactic structures to "arbitrarily" determine the mood. For Bull the Indicative occurs in independent and coordinate clauses, and he disclaims any significance of the choice, simply because it is "arbitrary".

Bull's analysis is identical to other analyses in the requirement that the complement be semantically matched with the matrix (cf. the underlined statement in my quotation of Bull, p. 45).

Since the analysis thus far presented is essentially similar to other analyses, it should be the case that it faces similar problems. That is correct. There are in Spanish sentences like (46) and (47), where either the Indicative or the Subjunctive can be used in the complement.

- (46) a. Estoy totalmente convencido de que Luis llamó. (IND)
 b. Estoy totalmente convencido de que Luis hubiera llamado. (SUBJ)

'I'm totally convinced that Luis called up.'

- (47) a. No me queda la menor duda de que el acusado es culpable. (IND)
b. No me queda la menor duda de que el acusado sea culpable. (SUBJ)

'There isn't the slightest doubt in my mind that the defendant is guilty.'

According to Bull's parameters, be it "positive knowledge", "experience", "evidence", or "blind faith", the attitude expressed in the matrices of these sentences would require that the complement take the Indicative only, to express redundantly that the noun clause is felt to be "experienced". The occurrence of the Subjunctive in (46b) and (47b) would be entirely unexpected in Bull's analysis, or would have to be interpreted as "nonexperience", which will amount to claim that the sentence is incongruous; these sentences, however, are entirely congruous, and the (a) sentences are synonymous with their corresponding (b) sentences.

These sentences, then, falsify Bull's analysis. By the same token, sentences like (48) pose serious problems for Bull's analysis.

- (48) a. ¡No puedo creer que ya regresaste! (IND)
b. ¡No puedo creer que ya hayas regresado! (SUBJ)

'I can't believe that you have returned already!'

These sentences are synonymous in terms of "experience", or "positive knowledge" of the event expressed in the complement, i.e. the complement is known by the speaker to be true; and

there cannot be vacillation between accepting or not the evidence as actual experience. The reading of both (48a) and (48b) is one of surprise in face of an unexpected experience.

Thus, Bull's analysis is proven wrong in two ways: (i) the mood alternation does not correlate with "experience" vs. "nonexperience"; and (ii) the claim that the modal contrast in the subordinate clause redundantly expresses the attitude overtly expressed in the main clause does not hold.

Let us turn to another aspect of Bull [1965].

2.3.2 Relationship of events to events. Bull (p. 184) claims that there are two types of significant relationship of events to events: (a) one event causes the second to take place (cause-effect), and (b) an event or state results from the occurrence of another event (the relationship, says Bull, does not need to be causal).⁷ Bull points out that both of these relationships may be stated covertly by two coordinate clauses and the indicative mode (the relationship is implicit), or they can be expressed overtly by using a relator word, either a preposition (or prepositional phrase) or an adverb, or also by means of a main and a subordinate clause. In the latter case the verb of the subordinate clause is always in the Subjunctive. (49) is an example of the cause-effect relationship, and (50) contains a resulting event; these examples are Bull's.

(49) a. Se golpea el vidrio y se rompe. (IND)

'One hits the glass and it breaks.'

b. Se golpea el vidrio para que se rompa. (SUBJ)

'One hits the glass in order to break it.'

(50) a. Papá vuelve y mamá se alegra. (IND)

'Dad returns and mom is glad.'

b. Papá vuelve para que mamá se alegre. (SUBJ)

'Dad returns in order to make mom happy.'

The (b) sentences contain "purpose" clauses rather than noun clauses; let us nevertheless examine these sentences, since they are relevant for further developments in Bull's analysis.

Bull appears to have missed his point in these sentences. He suggests that the Subjunctive in the (b) sentences above is introduced transformationally, and therefore they do not contrast with the (a) sentences, where the Indicative is used. The fact is that these pairs of sentences are not perfectly synonymous. It is true that there is an implicit relationship (cause-effect, previous event-resulting event) in the coordinate, i.e. (a) sentences; but these are usually interpreted as "Whenever Event W occurs Event X also occurs" (this reading could be easily interpreted as "experience", in the sense that the speaker "knows" that one event leads to the other, as he may have observed). But in the (b) sentences, the interpretation is different, "Event W occurs to

purposefully cause Event X to occur" (the purpose clause can be interpreted as "nonexperience", in the sense that the event is expected to occur but the speaker does not know whether it will occur or not). The (a) sentences have a "generic" sense; the (b) sentences make reference to a specific instance of an event and the expected result. Obviously Bull's analysis would still be consistent, though not necessarily correct (as was shown above).

The semantic facts pointed out here suggest that the Subjunctive in the subordinate clause could not be introduced transformationally, unless transformations are allowed to change meanings (as in the pre-Aspects framework). Bull is right in that the Indicative occurs in the coordinate clauses, and that the Subjunctive occurs in the subordinate ("purpose") clause; but as was shown above, the reason is not entirely syntactic, but rather semantic, since the relationship of the events is looked at from different angles in each case.

2.3.2.1 Another set of relationships examined in Bull [1965] is what he calls "stimulus-response". This makes reference to events

which only take place inside the nervous system, that is, the psychological events. These are the responses to stimuli (...) the stimulus is the cause; the response is the effect. The Spaniard, consequently, may deal with this relationship in the same fashion as any cause-effect relationship.
[p. 191]

(51) a. Papá vuelve y mamá se alegra. (IND)

'Dad returns and Mom is glad.'

b. Mamá se alegra de que papá vuelva. (SUBJ)

'Mom is glad that Dad returns.'

Bull (pp. 191-192) points out that this type of relationship can be organized in two different ways: (a) "the speaker may consider only the relationship between the two events (cause and effect) and, therefore, use the Subjunctive in the subordinate clause":

(52) Me alegro de que esté aquí. (SUBJ)

'I'm glad that he is here.'

(53) Es una lástima que haya ido. (SUBJ)

'It's a shame that he has gone.'

or (b), "the speaker may organize the same reality in terms of experience and anticipation (nonexperience) and disregard the cause-effect relationship. Since the stimulus must precede the response, he reports both as part of his experience and uses the Indicative":⁸

(52') Me alegro de que está aquí. (IND)

(53') Es una lástima que ha ido. (IND)

Bull, apparently, did not notice that the cause-effect relationship is not expressed in the same fashion that the stimulus-response relationship normally is, both in the clause

that is subordinated and in the choice of mood in the subordinate clause. Notice the following strings.

(54) a. Tú hiciste el trabajo y ella se alegra. (IND)(IND)

'You did the work and she is glad.'

b. Tú hiciste el trabajo para que ella

se { alegrara. } (SUBJ)
{ *alegra. } (IND)

'You did the work in order to make her happy.'

c. Ella se alegra de que tú hubieras hecho el trabajo. (SUBJ)

d. Ella se alegra de que tú hiciste el trabajo. (IND)

'She's happy that you did the work.'

(54a), the coordinate sentences, seems to be neutral in terms of cause-effect; it may be more readily interpreted as a stimulus-response sentence. In the preceding section it was shown that sentences like (54b), which contain a "purpose" clause cannot be derived from coordinate sentences, unless transformations are allowed to change meaning. (54b) and (54c-c') differ in the quality of the relationships between the events. While in (54b) the "cause" event is purposefully carried out, i.e. it is aimed at obtaining a goal (expressed in the subordinate clause), in (54c-c') the relationship is rather casual, i.e. the resulting event is a matter of chance. Semantically, then, (54c-c') is much closer to (54a) than (54b) is, which might shed some light on the possibility of choosing the Indicative in the

subordinate clause in (54c-c'), but not in (54b), since the former, but not the latter, could be derived from (54a).

Now, in (54b), the cause-effect sentence, the "cause" clause has been chosen as the main sentence, while in (54c-c') the order has been reversed, i.e. the "stimulus" (or "cause") clause has been chosen as the subordinate sentence, while the "response" (or "effect") clause has been chosen as the main clause.

It is hard to see that the choice of mood (the Subjunctive) follows the pattern of the cause-effect relationship in the stimulus-response relationship, when the overt evidence points out that the "Spaniard" does not organize these events in the same fashion: the cause clause, in the pure cause-effect relationship, is not subordinated and takes the Indicative only (never the Subjunctive); but the "stimulus" clause is subordinated and can take either the Indicative or the Subjunctive verb form (when subordinated).

This should have great significance for a syntactically based analysis of the mood alternation (if it were the case that the choice were indeed syntactically governed), since it could be claimed that the stimulus clause, when embedded, allows for both moods, without any significance being attached to the choice. This would be more consistent with Bull's approach than claiming that when the speaker chooses the Indicative he disregards the cause-effect relationship and chooses to express the complement as his "experience".

This does not mean that Bull's analysis is correct, or that it could be made correct by minor improvements; in fact, since the stimulus-response reading, and the "experience" reading are equally available in (54a) and (54c-c') regardless of the mood chosen, it becomes apparent that Bull's analysis is entirely ad hoc and mistaken. It becomes apparent, then, that neither the relationship of the events nor the "experience"/"nonexperience" dichotomy are relevant for the choice of mood.

2.4 Overall summary and conclusion.

In this chapter, several proposals for explanations of the choice of mood in Spanish noun clauses were examined. First, it was shown that the hypothesis in Rivero [1971] that the Indicative correlated with the speaker's positive presupposition of truth, while the Subjunctive implied neutral attitude or no presupposition, could not explain even the specific set of data it was supposed to explain (i.e. sentences with matrices of opinion such as (no) creer, parecer, etc.), because either mood can be chosen independently of those correlates in Rivero's analysis. Second, the analysis of Terrell and Hooper [1972] constitutes an integration of many previous analyses and at the same time incorporates some of the findings of contemporary semantic theory. The claim made in Terrell and Hooper [1972]--and the related analyses--is that the mood is chosen according to several semantic notions and classes of matrices and complements. The main

generalization to be made in this analysis is that the Indicative correlates with assertion of truth (weak or strong) and with weak presupposition, and the Subjunctive correlates with nonassertion in general, including strong presupposition (Terrell [1974]). Thus, the classes of assertion, report and mental act will fall under the former (i.e. they choose the Indicative); and the classes of comment (strongly presupposed), doubt and imperative fall under the latter (i.e. they choose the Subjunctive). It was shown that all of these semantic notions and classes allow for both moods in noun clauses, with no radical semantic differences attached to the choice, which leads to the conclusion that this kind of analysis cannot explain the nature of the mood alternation (at least in some dialects). The semantic notions proposed in Terrell and Hooper and similar analyses must be part of the grammar of Spanish, since they do have semantic and syntactic consequences (not considered here); but mood is not governed uniquely or directly by these semantic notions. Third, it was shown that Bull [1965] was also inaccurate, and was faced with essentially the problems of the preceding analyses, plus some syntactic and semantic problems stemming from Bull's conception of the relationship of events and of the syntactic structures in which they can be rendered. His proposal is that the mood alternation is significant only where contrast is possible (i.e. almost exclusively in embedded clauses); otherwise it is syntactically governed

(hence "arbitrary"). The Indicative expresses "experience" of the event, and the Subjunctive "nonexperience" (where the contrast is significant). I do not dispute that the choice of mood is significant only where contrast is possible; nevertheless Bull misses a generalization in separating syntax and semantics, since he cannot explain the choice of mood in noun clauses, either.

The basis for choice of mood in Spanish noun clauses is, then, an open question. From the facts discussed above, it seems that the mood alternations are essentially manipulative (or stylistic); the Indicative and the Subjunctive can both be ambiguous in terms of assertion or presupposition, etc., but each seems to convey certain suprasemantic tints. The problem is far more complex than has been suggested in the literature. In the next chapter a system is described which explains the actual nature of Spanish mood alternations in noun clauses with, I believe, substantially greater adequacy than its predecessors.

Footnote to Chapter I

¹An abstract element is one that has semantic and syntactic consequences but no phonological shape. For instance, a sentence like No te muevas! 'don't move!', might be claimed to be dominated by an abstract verb of "commanding" which is not realized, but which "requires" that the verb of the sentence take a subjunctive form.

²In order to avoid disparity of opinion as to the acceptability of sentences Rivero makes use of negative matrices which she assumes to take both indicative and subjunctive complements in all dialects of Spanish.

³The references to Terrell and Hooper are based on the MS [1972]. This paper will appear in Hispania, 1974.

⁴This rationale has great influence on the alternative analysis I propose in Chapter II.

⁵This contrasts with matrices of belief, e.g. creer, whose negation casts doubt on the validity of the complement.

⁶Paul Schachter (personal communication) has suggested to me that if one could argue that dizque is an adverb, rather than a matrix "verb", it could be claimed that the verb is in an independent clause, in which case the Indicative is to be expected; thus (40) might be said to assert "the war is allegedly over".

This viewpoint seems to me entirely correct. Nevertheless, in Terrell and Hooper's system doubt and assertion are implied to be mutually exclusive (cf. chart (8), p. 16); and since doubt is conveyed by dizque, one should expect (according to their criterion) only the Subjunctive. Or, if we follow their analysis of independent sentences containing expressions like talvez 'perhaps', we might expect an alternation of mood in sentences like (40), as well.

(i) a. Talvez viene mañana. (IND)

b. Talvez venga mañana. (SUBJ)

'Perhaps he's coming tomorrow.'

Since no such alternation occurs, dizque must obviously be classified in a different class of adverbials than that of talvez. At best, sentences like (40) require more research than is intended here. And Terrell and Hooper's analysis needs more refinement in order to cope with facts like those exemplified in (40), and (38)-(39), as well.

⁷Bull does not explain here what the difference is between these two types of relationship. Apparently what he means is that an event can cause a second event either directly or indirectly.

⁸Bull (p. 192) points out that "the subjunctive appears to be more common in literary standard; the indicative seems to be gaining ground in educated speech". This statement is partially accurate; both moods are used in a natural way in "educated speech" in some dialects, and their difference is stylistic, rather than deep semantic.

Chapter II

An Alternative Analysis of Mood in Noun Clauses

0. Introductory remarks

In the preceding chapter some semantically based analyses of the Indicative-Subjunctive distinction in Spanish noun clauses were examined in detail, and it was shown that they cannot account for this distinction in a satisfactory way. At the same time it was indirectly proven that "syntactic" analyses that "predict" the mood of the verb in a noun clause from the class of matrix verb used or from higher abstract verbs cannot account for the mood distinction in a general way. The reason they fail is that although there are matrix verbs that co-occur with subjunctive complements only (e.g. the so-called verbs of wishing and wanting), there are also matrix verbs that can co-occur with both indicative and subjunctive complements without a semantic distinction in the noun clause (e.g. matrices expressing doubt or denial). Even if the matrix verbs were marked in the lexicon as accepting both indicative and subjunctive complements, an explanation of the mood alternation would still be needed.

It seems to me that part of the problem faced by previous analyses is lack of flexibility in their systems, especially in the requirement that the semantic notions of assertion, doubt, opinion, etc. (cf. Terrell and Hooper [1972], for example) assumed to underlie the noun clauses must be matched

with identical notions expressed in the matrix. For example, if the matrix expresses doubt, the noun clause has to convey the notion of doubt about its validity and must be expressed with the subjunctive; but it has been pointed out in the preceding chapter that the Indicative is possible in the noun clause, in spite of the notion of doubt (Lenz [1925] does allow for the Indicative in this case).

In short, for the most part, linguists who have analyzed mood distinctions in Spanish have ignored a great many facts. They have also ignored pragmatic factors that play a role in speech and in the mood alternation.

In the ensuing sections I will propose and elaborate on a system that I believe can explain the mood alternations in noun clauses. I do not expect to exhaust the matter, but I shall at least provide a substantial basis for serious research in the future.

My proposal is greatly influenced by the work of Lenz [1925], and Terrell and Hooper [1972]. (Cf. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.1 in Chapter I.)

1.0 Alternative Analysis

I propose that the mood distinctions in Spanish noun clauses can be explained in terms of a series of (for the most part binary) choices that the speaker makes in relation to the events and states (E) to be verbalized.¹ These choices will henceforth be referred to as the primary system.

The primary system contains essential factors of two types: (A) factors related to the speaker's cognition about the truth of E; and (B) factors related to impressionistic effects that the speaker wants to achieve. These factors are hierarchically organized. The (A) factors dominate the (B) factors. And the choices of mood are immediately dominated by the (B) factors.

(A) Cognition. E is either presupposed² or nonpresupposed. If it is presupposed, the E of the noun clause is true. If E is nonpresupposed, it may have either a positive or a negative truth value, or no truth value at all. A nonpresupposed E is either optative or nonoptative. If optative, the event of the noun clause has no truth value; its realization (or truth) is intimately linked to the speaker's (or someone else's) will in that either he wants to cause the event to be realized, as in sentence (1), or he wishes that the event will turn out to be realized (or true), as in sentence (2).

(1) Te exijo que apagues el radio. (SUBJ)

'I demand you turn off the radio.'

(2) Espero que Roque haya encontrado el reloj. (SUBJ)

'I hope that Roque has found the watch.'

If nonoptative, the truth of E is independent of the speaker's (or someone else's) will (as opposed to the

optative E's). The E may be true or false, or may have no truth value. The noun clause in sentence (3), for example, expresses a nonoptative E.

(3) Creo que Hernando te está esperando. (IND)

'I think Hernando is waiting for you.'

(B) Impressionistic effects (and mood correlations).

A presupposed E can either be placed in relief, or relegated to the semantic background. In other words, a presupposed E can be either [+ FOCUS] or [- FOCUS]. If [+ FOCUS], the Indicative will be chosen, as in (4a); otherwise the Subjunctive will be chosen, as in (4b).³

(4) a. Me enfureció que me insultaron. (IND)

b. Me enfureció que me hubieran insultado. (SUBJ)

'It enraged me that they insulted me.'

A (nonpresupposed) optative E⁴ can be expressed either emphatically or nonemphatically. If emphatic, the Indicative can be chosen. Sentences (5a) and (6a) are redundantly emphatic: they mark emphasis in the Indicative verb form of the noun clause, and in the intonation contour. Sentences (5b) and (6b) can be assigned an emphatic intonation contour, but emphasis is not marked in the Subjunctive noun clause.

- (5) a. Yo ordené que tú te ibas ahora mismo! (IND)
 b. Yo ordené que tú te fueras ahora mismo! (SUBJ)
 'I ordered you to leave right now!'

- (6) a. Esperó que pasaste el examen! (IND)
 b. Espero que hayas pasado el examen! (SUBJ)
 'I hope that you (have) passed the exam!'

If nonemphatic, the Subjunctive will be chosen in optative noun clauses. In general, the unmarked mood for all optative noun clauses is the Subjunctive; the emphatic Indicative is extremely restricted in this type of noun clause.

A nonpresupposed nonoptative E--whose realization, or truth value, can be either reported or submitted to discussion--can be represented as either having a truth value or having no truth value.⁵ If [+ Truth value], the Indicative will be chosen, as in sentence (7a). If [- Truth value], the Subjunctive will be chosen, as in sentence (7b).

- (7) a. Me imagino que viene mañana. (IND)
 b. Me imagino que venga mañana. (SUBJ)

'I imagine he's coming/might come tomorrow.'

The [+ Truth value] representation can more readily be assigned a truth value, either positive or negative; by contrast, the [- Truth value] representation is more vague in truth value.

The primary system just outlined can be represented in a tree like (P. System), p. 66. This tree shows the hierarchic organization of the Primary System.

2.0 Other factors


The choice of mood in noun clauses will be based essentially on the criteria explicitly mentioned in the primary system. Nevertheless, there exist in language use other factors that determine that one mood may be preferred over the other (even though both moods are possible in the same instance). These factors are related to the speaker's idiosyncratic manipulation of the primary system. I will provide below some isolated factors that I consider relevant in certain manipulations of the primary system.

2.1 Implicit attribution. Although the primary system is attributed to the speaker, it must be clear that it can be attributed also to any speaker. Thus a particular speaker can manipulate the primary system in such a way that its application is implicitly attributed to speakers other than himself. In other words, the application of the primary system can fall either within the speaker's domain or outside his domain. This is apparently the case in sentences like (8).

(8) No estoy seguro de que Pablo pagó el préstamo. (IND)

'I'm not sure that Pablo paid back the loan.'

(P. SYSTEM)



The noun clause, Pablo pagó el préstamo, is nonpresupposed and nonoptative; its truth value is different if the matrix sentence is nonnegated; and the speaker's will is not involved in the realization of the event expressed in the clause. For the speaker this clause has no specific truth value, it could be either true or false, as the matrix sentence reveals; it is to be expected, then, that since the event is [- Truth value] for the speaker of (8), the noun clause will be expressed with a subjunctive verb form, and this is in fact the "unmarked" mood in sentences with the semantic content exemplified in (8). Nevertheless, (8) is well formed (at least in my dialect), and would be synonymous with a sentence containing a subjunctive verb form in the noun clause, as (9), since both will cast doubt on the truth of the event expressed in the noun clause.

- (9) No estoy seguro de que Pablo haya pagado el préstamo.
 (SUBJ)
 'I'm not sure that Pablo has paid back the loan.'

Thus, the explanation for the choice of the Indicative lies in the fact that the noun clause in (8) is not readily interpreted as the speaker's version of the event, but rather as a "quoted" expression. In other words, in (8) the speaker expresses his attitude toward the information provided by another speaker who represented the nonpresupposed event as [+ Truth value]; hence the Indicative, as predicted by the primary system.

2.2 "Pragmatic" factors. Other factors that might play a role in the manipulation of the primary system fall under the notion of "pragmatic presupposition" (cf. Keenan [1971]).

2.2.1 One element relevant for the choice of mood seems to be provided by the discourse content itself. For instance, if the notion of FOCUS is associated with a vague idea of relevance or importance--as might be assumed--one would naturally expect that in a sentence like (10) the noun clause should contain an indicative verb form (and this form only), since the predicate interesantísimo signals that the event expressed in the noun clause is highly valued, at least for the speaker's interest.

(10) a. Es interesantísimo que la gente se ríe sin razón.
(IND)

b. Es interesantísimo que la gente se ría sin razón.
(SUBJ)

'It's extremely interesting that people laugh
for no reason.'

(These sentences can both be ambiguous, but I am interested here only in the presupposed reading.)

It seems a little surprising that the Subjunctive occurs as the most natural form in this type of sentences, as in (10b), while the Indicative turns out to be rather marked (in dialects like mine).

On close inspection, however, the surprise disappears, when it is seen that the function of FOCUS is not so much to signal that an event is important for the speaker, but rather

to call the interlocutor's attention to the event. Thus, in discourse, a sentence like (10a) has an extremely low frequency; once it has been put in relief, or pointed out, the event is usually taken for granted and relegated to the semantic background, no matter how important it could be for the speaker; thus, sentences like (10b) are more frequently used in the discourse, and this is why the Subjunctive appears to be the "unmarked" mood for this type of sentences.

2.2.2 Another "pragmatic" factor in the manipulation of the primary system is one of "interpersonal relations" or "manners". For instance, the Spanish speaker knows that both (11a) and (11b) are grammatically well formed.

- (11) a. Yo no creo que usted hizo la tarea. (IND)
b. Yo no creo que usted hubiera hecho la tarea. (SUBJ)
'I don't believe that you did your homework.'

Nevertheless, since (11a) implies that the speaker considers the noun clause to be a lie, "good manners" demand that the speaker avoid using this type of sentence; but it can be used, with little offense, when there exist great familiarity with the interlocutor. Then, the Subjunctive is preferred in this type of sentences, as in (11b), simply because the connotation is weakened to mere uncertainty.

2.3 Summary. To summarize the foregoing outline, my proposal for an explanation of the choice of mood in Spanish

noun clauses includes a primary system which provides the semantic features on which the choice is based, and a set of factors intended to explain the speaker's idiosyncratic manipulation of the primary system of features.

3.0 Ambiguity

Before entering into details about the plausibility of the analysis outlined above, I would like to mention one particular characteristic: its margin of ambiguity.

The primary system fulfills a bidirectional function in communication. On the one hand, the speaker uses it in encoding the expressions, and on the other hand, the hearer uses it in decoding the utterances. The choice of mood is unambiguous (to a certain extent) for the speaker, since he supposedly "knows" what paths lead him to choose the proper mood, either the Indicative or the Subjunctive; but the system predicts that ambiguity can arise for the hearer, since Spanish uses in its noun clauses the two moods both in the expression of presupposed E's, and in the expression of non-presupposed E's. This is not to say that every sentence of the language is interpreted ambiguously, but simply that the possibility for interpretive ambiguity is open in the system. There exist variables in the language--intonation contour, context, etc.--which will help disambiguate particular utterances; but even so, there is a considerable margin of ambiguity in the language, which will turn out to be explainable in terms of the system proposed here. This will become clear in the ensuing sections.

4.0 Differences from other analyses

The analysis I propose here differs from all previous analyses known to me in two substantial ways. First, although the notion of (logical) presupposition is adopted in the present analysis--just as Terrell and Hooper [1972] did--and so is the traditional notion of optative sentences, this system disregards the intricacies involved in certain semantic notions that have been associated with the choice of mood in other analyses. These include notions like unreality, doubt, possibility, affectivity, subjectivity, nonrepresentation, nonexperience, etc., which have been claimed to require the Subjunctive, and notions like reality, certainity, objectivity, representation, experience, etc., which have been claimed to require the Indicative. The system I propose even disregards the notions of assertion (weak and strong) and nonassertion which have been proposed as the triggers for the Indicative and the Subjunctive, respectively. And second, in the present analysis, the choice of mood in the noun clause does not depend on the class of matrix selected, but on the features assigned to the expression of the E. The matrix sentence usually reports either the way in which the information was conveyed, or an attitude toward the truth of the event expressed in the noun clause, or the way in which its subject is affected by the event, etc. The matrix sentence and the noun clause, in this view, simply complement each other to form a semantic whole.

One clarification is necessary. I do not claim that semantic notions like those listed above are not important in language; they are, indeed, as evidenced by the fact that the language includes lexical items with those specific meanings. What I claim is that the mood alternations are not directly (much less, uniquely) governed by any of those particular notions, as was shown in my review of previous analyses (Chapter I).

Let us now examine some facts of Spanish in the light of the analysis just outlined, in an attempt to test its plausibility and advantages over other analyses.

5.0 Explorations and plausibility


Although I will attempt to examine the system in an orderly manner, taking up only one set of elements at a time, it will be necessary in some instances to cross over into other sets. This is due to the nature of the essentially bimodal system of Spanish, which, as pointed out before, might lead to interpretive ambiguity.

5.1 Presupposed E's. It is widely accepted⁶ that presupposed noun clauses can be recognized if they pass two basic semantico-syntactic tests, (a) they can be introduced by the head NP el (hecho de) que 'the fact that', and (b) they must be true whether the matrix sentence is negated or not. These principles are adopted here, as well, without further comments.

5.1.1 Terrell and Hooper's presupposed sentences

"commented upon". Terrell and Hooper [1972] claim that presupposed sentences that are "commented upon" (e.g. es interesante que [Sentence]) require that their verb take a subjunctive form, while presupposed sentences in relation to which a "mental act" takes place (e.g. tomar en cuenta que [Sentence]) require an indicative verb form. This dichotomy poses insurmountable difficulties for their analysis. They want to relate the Indicative uniquely with the notion of assertion of truth, and claim that assertion and presupposition are two mutually exclusive notions; but it turns out, in their analysis, that some presupposed complements are assertions after all (cf. Terrell [1974]). In brief, their system falls to pieces when faced with this particular problem.

Let us reexamine the facts, in the light of the system proposed here. For convenience, I will reproduce below the fragment of the tree on page 66 which is relevant for presupposed E's.



5.1.2 Semantic uses of presupposed propositions.

Semantically, a presupposed proposition can be used in several ways:

(a) instrumentally, i.e. either (i) as evidence in an argument, as in (12)

(12) a. El hecho de que Nixon renunció sugiere
que era culpable. (IND)

b. El hecho de que Nixon hubiera renunciado
sugiere que era culpable. (SUBJ)

'The fact that Nixon quit suggests that
he was guilty.'

or (ii) as the cause of a subjective reaction, as in (13)

(13) a. A María le molesta (el hecho de) que fumamos.
(IND)

b. A María le molesta (el hecho de) que fumemos.
(SUBJ)

'It bothers María that we smoke.'

(b) appraisally, as in (14) and (15)

(14) a. Estuvo bien que vendiste tu carro. (IND)

b. Estuvo bien que hubieras vendido tu carro. (SUBJ)

'It was good that you (had) sold your car.'

(15) a. Es innegable que Ford cometió un error. (IND)

b. Es innegable que Ford hubiera cometido un error. (SUBJ)

'It's undeniable that Ford made a mistake.'

(c) perceptively, or as the object of a "mental act" in Terrell and Hooper's sense, as in (16)

(16) a. Tomaremos en cuenta el hecho de que trabajaste bien. (IND)

b. Tomaremos en cuenta el hecho de que hubieras trabajado bien. (SUBJ)

'We'll take into consideration the fact that you (have) worked well.'

5.1.2.1 Gaps. Not all the Spanish speakers agree on the choice of mood in presupposed propositions. The situation is rather unstable, even within a single idiolect, as evidenced by the fact that I find strings like (14a), or its synonymous (17a), below, of doubtful acceptability, or at least awkward,

(17) a. Fue bueno que vendiste tu carro. (IND)

b. Fue bueno que hubieras vendido tu carro. (SUBJ)

'It was good that you (had) sold your car.'

while I find the Indicative perfectly natural in sentences like (18). I have no explanation for the difference in acceptability between (17a) and (18a).

(18) a. ¡Qué bueno que vendiste tu carro! (IND)

b. ¡Qué bueno que hubieras vendido tu carro! (SUBJ)

'How good that you sold your car!'

By the same token, while I find the Subjunctive somewhat awkward in (15b), I find it natural in its synonymous (19b).

Again, I have no explanation for this difference in acceptability.

- (19) a. No se puede negar que Ford cometió un error. (IND)
b. No se puede negar que Ford hubiera cometido un error. (SUBJ)

'It can't be denied that Ford made a mistake.'

It can then be safely assumed that the Indicative-Subjunctive alternation is available in the grammar of Spanish presupposed propositions, but that there exist certain dialectal and idiolectal gaps.

5.1.3 [+/- FOCUS] in presupposed noun clauses. Although someone might claim that the choice of mood in presupposed propositions is insignificant, the fact is that the native speaker of Spanish feels that the indicative version of the presupposed proposition is somehow different from the subjunctive version.

Let us examine sentence (20), which seems to be optimal for clarity of the alleged difference.

- (20) a. Me alegro de que conseguiste empleo. (IND)
b. Me alegro de que hubieras conseguido empleo. (SUBJ)

'I'm glad that you got a job.'

Presupposed propositions are true, regardless of the mood chosen. The noun clause is true, both in (20a) and in (20b). Thus, if these sentences are felt to be different, the

difference cannot be related to the truth value of the noun clauses.

Now, in (20a), where the Indicative is used in the presupposed proposition, the speaker gives the impression of heartily participating in the "good news" of the event, he shows that he really cares for his interlocutor. In (20b), where the Subjunctive is used in the presupposed clause, the sentence sounds more like a polite remark, with a diminished affective charge. It could be said, then, that the two sentences differ in degree of affectivity. However, since clauses embedded in sentences with high affective content, like (18) (Qué bueno que vendiste/hubieras bendido tu carro!), can take either an indicative or a subjunctive verb form, it is clear that affectivity is not exactly the general factor that determines the choice of mood. Neither is emphasis, for the same reason (emphasis reveals affective charge). The real reason for the mood alternation is that the speaker chooses to either place the E in relief (hence the Indicative), or to relegate it to a secondary status (hence the Subjunctive). This interpretation seems to be applicable in general to presupposed propositions. The affective charge is, then, provided by the whole sentence, depending on the semantic interpretation of the matrix clause plus the presupposed proposition. Notice that the different degrees of affectivity seem not to be relevant in sentences like (13) (A María le molesta que fumamos/fumemos); the indicative

form simply calls attention to the presupposed E, as if it constituted the heart of the message; and the subjunctive form expresses the E as a secondary message unit, as an unimportant event.

It seems to me, then, that the notion of FOCUS serves us rather adequately as a systematic label for the contrast suggested above.

5.1.3.1 FOCUS and matrices of "perception". It has been claimed that the Indicative must be used in noun clauses embedded in "mental act" matrices, or matrices of "perception". Moreover, in analyses like Terrell and Hooper [1972], and Terrell [1974], these noun clauses participate in a--for these linguists--contradictory dichotomy (according to their system, these noun clauses are presupposed but asserted, two notions they believe to be mutually exclusive).

In the primary system proposed here, these noun clauses are ambiguous. They can be either presupposed or nonpresupposed, depending on the "pragmatic" context. For instance, a sentence like (21) can be interpreted in two ways.

(21) Me dí cuenta (de) que Pedro estaba cansado. (IND)

'I realized that Pedro was tired.'

If the interlocutor is assumed to know the truth of the noun clause, then E is presupposed. If the E is not assumed to be known to the interlocutor, then the proposition is not presupposed, and is intended to provide information about

the E. In the latter case, the E is assigned a [+ Truth value] representation; hence the Indicative.

Let us, however, concentrate on the presupposed reading.

5.1.3.1.1 If the matrix sentence is not negated then a "perceptive act" is projected on the E. As a natural consequence of this projection, FOCUS is placed on the event of the noun clause, and hence the Indicative, as in (21), above. This, however, is not the only possibility.

There exist Spanish speakers (I for one) who may choose to defocus the presupposed E in sentences like (21). In this case the Subjunctive is used in the noun clause, thus expressing a subtle meaning of 'not giving importance' or 'not paying attention' to the E. This defocusing process is normally followed by an explicit conjunctive proposition as pero no le dí importancia al asunto 'but I didn't pay much attention to it'; alternatively, the matrix sentence can be emphasized with sí (= English emphatic do), and the whole sentence can optionally be followed by the explicit conjunctive material, as in (22).

(22) Yo sí me dí cuenta de que Pedro estuviera cansado
(pero no le dí importancia al asunto). (SUBJ)

'I did realize that Pedro was tired (but I didn't pay much attention to it).'

Since it has been stated above that FOCUS is a natural consequence of the projection of a perceptive act on the (presupposed) E, defocusing should be rather unnatural. And

it is, in the sense that this choice is highly marked. Otherwise, in terms of the primary system, the choice is legitimate.

5.1.3.1.2 The perceptive projection on the presupposed E is broken when the "mental act" matrix is negated. It is to be expected, then, that the most natural choice would be to defocus the presupposed E. This is a logical possibility, but not necessarily true, since what is broken is the perceptive projection of a particular subject at a given time, and not necessarily the importance that the presupposed event may have in the speaker's appraisal at the moment of speaking. The situation is a little complex, but perfectly explainable in terms of the analysis proposed in this study. Let us look into the following sentences:

- (23) a. Pablo no tomó en cuenta que María nos había ayudado. (IND)
b. Pablo no tomó en cuenta que María nos hubiera ayudado. (SUBJ)
'Pablo didn't take into consideration that Maria had helped us.'
- (24) a. ?A mí no me importa que tú tienes dinero. (IND)
b. A mí no me importa que tú tengas dinero. (SUBJ)
'I don't care about your having money.'

Both (23a) and (23b) are perfectly acceptable. By contrast, (24a), where the Indicative is used in the noun clause, is of doubtful acceptability, while (24b), where the Subjunctive

is used in the noun clause, is entirely natural. These two pairs of strings differ in two important ways: (a) while in (24) the person (a dative) involved in the matrix is coreferent with the speaker, in (23) the subject of the matrix sentence is not coreferent with the speaker; and (b), while in (24) the matrix expresses an "affective reaction", in (23) the matrix expresses a "mental act". In (24) the matrix sentence explicitly denotes that the presupposed E lacks importance for the speaker, which means that the E of the noun clause was, in the first place, assigned a secondary status by the speaker. The unacceptability of the indicative form in (24a) comes from the fact that the string would be entirely incongruous in that the speaker claims unimportance for the presupposed E, and at the same time the E is put in relief. The Indicative in noun clauses will be acceptable in constructions like (24) if the dative of the matrix sentence is not coreferent with the speaker, as in (25).

- (25) a. A Pablo no le importa que tú tienes dinero. (IND)
 b. A Pablo no le importa que tú tengas dinero. (SUBJ)
 'Pablo doesn't care about your having money.'

The acceptability of both moods in sentence (25) can be explained in the same terms that the choices in (23) can be explained. The situation in both cases is different from (24). In (23) and (25) the E of the noun clause seems to be important for the speaker, both in the (a) version and in the

(b) version of the sentences, since these sentences read as recriminatory remarks. Nevertheless, since the higher NP (either subject or dative) is different from the speaker, in (23) and (25), the speaker has two options open to him: (i) place the E under FOCUS, thus revealing that the E is important for the speaker; or (ii) assign to the E a secondary status, in agreement with the content of the matrix sentence, thus attributing the [- FOCUS] representation to the higher NP. In the first case he chooses the Indicative, and in the second case the Subjunctive.

In sentences containing "mental act" matrix verbs whose subject is coreferent with the speaker, either the Indicative or the Subjunctive are acceptable in the noun clause, as in (26) and (27).

- (26) a. Yo no tomé en cuenta que María nos había ayudado. (IND)
 b. Yo no tomé en cuenta que María nos hubiera ayudado. (SUBJ)
 'I didn't take into consideration that
 Maria had helped us.'

- (27) a. No recordé que tú habías entrado. (IND)
 b. No recordé que tú hubieras entrado. (SUBJ)
 'I didn't remember that you had come in.'

In these sentences the [+/- FOCUS] representations cannot be attributed but to the speaker. Here again, the Indicative conveys the meaning that the E of the noun clause is important for the speaker, while the Subjunctive gives the E a reading of unimportance.

Although both moods are acceptable in sentences like (26) and (27), there is a tendency among Spanish speakers to use the Indicative more often in these types of sentences. In (26), the reason seems to be that the sentence is self-recriminatory, which means that the E of the noun clause is important for the speaker; hence the Indicative; (nevertheless, one can also be self-indulgent and consider that the E was not important after all, hence the Subjunctive). In (27), the reason is that since the interlocutor is involved in the E of the noun clause, "good manners" determine that the speaker should show that the E is important for him; it would be little polite to assign a secondary status to the E. Otherwise, the mood alternation is legitimate.

5.1.4 Summary. In the foregoing exploration it has been seen that the choice of mood in presupposed propositions produces certain impressionistic effects: The Indicative seems either to call the interlocutor's attention to the event, or to assign a sense of importance to it; the Subjunctive seems either to place the event in the background of the sentence (in a neutral way), or to assign a low value to the event.

In cases where one or the other mood seems to be more natural, or to exclude the other, it has been seen that this is a logical consequence of the semantic content of the sentence as a whole, or of the pragmatic context in which the sentence is placed.

5.2 Nonpresupposed E's. Unlike presupposed E's, which must be inherently true, nonpresupposed E's need not be true. Thus, a sentence expressing a nonpresupposed E can be either true or false, or have no truth value.

The cognitive world of the speaker divides nonpresupposed E's into optative and nonoptative.

5.2.1 Optative E's. Optative E's have no truth value. In the expression of optative E's the speaker (or someone else) wishes that they were realized (or true). The expression of these E's can be either imperative or nonimperative. It is imperative if the realization (or nonrealization) of the E by its agent (either the person(s) addressed or the agent explicitly mentioned in the optative sentence) is imposed on the agent (by petition, command, etc.), as in (28).

(28) Jaime le ordenó a Mariela que cocinara un pollo. (SUBJ)

'Jaime ordered Mariela to cook a chicken.'

It is nonimperative (or simply desiderative) if the realization of the event is not imposed on its agent, but is simply desired, as in (29).

(29) Ojalá llegara temprano el avión. (SUBJ)

'May the plane arrive early.'

5.2.1.1 Aspect restrictions. Imperative noun clauses can take only nonperfective verb forms, as (30) illustrates.

- (30) Ella nos pidió que $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{salgamos.} \\ \text{saliéramos.} \\ \text{*hayamos salido.} \\ \text{*hubieramos salido.} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} (\text{impf}) \\ (\text{impf}) \\ (\text{pf}) \\ (\text{pf}) \end{array}$

'She asked us to leave.'

Nonimperative (desiderative) noun clauses can take both perfective and nonperfective verb forms, as (31) illustrates.


- (31) Ella desea que $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{salgamos.} \\ \text{hayamos salido.} \\ \text{hubiéramos salido.} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} (\text{impf}) \\ (\text{pf}) \\ (\text{pf}) \end{array}$

These restrictions are logical consequences of the nature of these E's. While one can wish that an E will turn out to be true, or realized either in the past or in the future, he cannot order the realization of an event that has already been realized. The realization of an imperative E must be posterior to the moment at which the command is given.

Optative noun clauses also exhibit certain restrictions in the tenses their verbs can take. The nature of these restrictions is less clear to me.

I am not certain as to the place these restrictions should occupy in the grammar of Spanish, but they might be directly associated with the cognitive factors proposed in the primary system.

5.2.1.2 Mood in optative E's. Let me reproduce the fragment of the tree on page 66 which is relevant for the choice of mood in the expression of optative E's in noun clauses.



The primary system allows for the choice of either the Indicative or the Subjunctive in optative noun clauses. The Subjunctive is associated with nonemphatic expressions of optative E's, while the Indicative is associated with the emphatic reading.⁷ The unmarked mood in all optative noun clauses is the Subjunctive. The Indicative is extremely restricted, and should be taken as a marginal choice.

The Indicative is acceptable (in my dialect) in sentences with an imperative reading when embedded in matrix sentences containing only the verbs ordenar, insistir en, disponer, decidir, and decir ('order', 'insist', 'tell').

(32)

El jefe	{	ordenó	que tú	{	cantas!
		dispuso			cantabas!
		decidió			cantarás!
		dijo			cantarías!
		insistió en			*cantaste!
					*has cantado!

'The boss ordered/decided/said for you
to sing/insisted that you must sing.'

As shown in (32), the Indicative noun clause with an imperative reading is also subject to the verb aspect restriction to which the Subjunctive (imperative) verb forms are subject. No perfective forms are allowed.

The use of the Indicative in sentences with imperative readings implies that the realization of the E is enforced. It conveys a sense of "superauthority" over the agent of the optative E. It is perhaps because of this strong connotation that the use of the Indicative in this type of sentences is "politely" avoided. Otherwise, the choice of the Indicative appears to be legitimate, when extra emphasis is placed on the command.

The Indicative can be used also in desiderative noun clauses, but only when these are embedded in matrix sentences containing the verbs esperar 'to hope', and confiar 'to hope firmly'.

- (33) a. Espero que { (?) pasas } el examen.
 b. pasarás
 c. pasaste
 d. has pasado
 e. habrás pasado

'I hope that you pass/will pass/passed/
 have passed/will have passed the exam.'

- (34) a. Confío en que { pasas } el examen.
 b. pasarás
 c. pasaste
 d. has pasado
 e. habrás pasado

'I hope firmly that you pass/will pass/passed
 have passed/will have passed the exam.'


I find (33a) somehow odd, but I have no explanation for its oddness.

When the Indicative is used in this type of sentence, the speaker not only wishes that the E were true, but wants to be reassured that it is/will be true. In this sense the expression of the desiderative noun clause is said to be emphatic.

5.2.1.3 Summary. In the foregoing exploration it has been seen that the Indicative gives the optative clause a higher degree of emphasis. It has also been seen that the unmarked mood for optative noun clauses is the Subjunctive. The Indicative is extremely restricted in optative noun clauses.

5.2.2 Nonpresupposed nonoptative E's. Nonpresupposed nonoptative E's can be presented as either true or false, or as lacking a truth value. It is in connection with such events that notions such as assertion, doubt, uncertainty, representation, etc., play a role in semantic interpretation. Nevertheless, these notions per se do not determine the choice of mood. In the system proposed here, the choice of mood is determined by the impressionistic features [+ Truth value] (= IND), and [- Truth value] (= SUBJ). In the first case the truth value of the noun clause can be readily assigned (the sentence is either true or false). In the second case the noun clause is neither true nor false. Whether an E is expressed with an indicative verb form or with a subjunctive verb form (in a noun clause) is, for the most part, the speaker's free choice. The [+ Truth value] representation does not mean that the speaker is necessarily committed to the truth of the E. Neither does the [- Truth value] representation mean that the E lacks a truth value for the speaker. This will become clear in the ensuing exploration.

Let me, for convenience, reproduce the fragment of the tree on page 66 which is relevant for the choice of mood in nonpresupposed nonoptative noun clauses.



Let us examine some constructions in the light of the system proposed here.

5.2.2.1 Noun clauses embedded in "reporting matrix sentences".

- (35) a. El profesor me contó que tú habías estudiado. (IND)
 b. (?) El profesor me contó que tú hubieras estudiado. (SUBJ)
 'The professor told me that you had studied.'

Sentence (35) contains a "reporting" matrix verb (contar) which expresses the way (narrative) in which the information about the E expressed in the noun clause was conveyed. (35b) in isolation sounds unnatural; strings like this are acceptable, however, if followed by a conjunct like pero se me había olvidado 'but I had forgotten it', or if used in a context in which the information has already been mentioned in the discourse.

The noun clauses in (35a-b) can be interpreted ambiguously. They are either presupposed or nonpresupposed (nonoptative). They are presupposed when they remain true under negation of the matrix sentence.

- (36) a. El profesor no me contó que tú habías estudiado.
 b. El profesor no me contó que tú hubieras estudiado.
 'The professor didn't tell me that you had studied.'

Also, they are presupposed when a comment is added to the sentence, as in (37).

- (37) a. El profesor me contó que tú habías estudiado.
 Eso me alegró mucho.
 b. El profesor me contó que tú hubieras estudiado.
 Eso me alegró mucho.
 'The professor told me that you had studied.
 That really pleased me.'

Eso 'that' refers to the noun clause, i.e. that you had studied.

The noun clauses are nonpresupposed when a question is added, as in (38)

- (38) a. El profesor me contó que tú habías estudiado.
 Es cierto eso?
 b. El profesor me contó que tú hubieras estudiado.
 Es cierto eso?
 'The professor told me that you had studied.
 Had you?'

The question does not refer to the matrix sentence but to the truth of the complement. Since the validity of a presupposed proposition cannot be questioned, (38) is logically interpreted as nonpresupposed.

The noun clauses are also nonpresupposed when doubt is cast on the validity of the noun clause under negation of the matrix sentence, as in (39)

- (39) a. El profesor no me contó que tú habías estudiado
(por eso no creo que tú hubieras estudiado).
- b. El profesor no me contó que tú hubieras estudiado
(por eso no creo que tú hubieras estudiado).
- 'The professor didn't tell me that you had studied
(that's why I don't believe you had studied).'

In (35) then, we find a four-way opposition that fits nicely into the system proposed here. Under the presupposed reading, the E expressed in the noun clause is placed under FOCUS to give relevance to it, as in (35a); or it is defocused, as in (35b), to convey a reading of unimportance, or inattention. Obviously "good manners" determine that the Spanish speaker avoid this latter use so as not to offend his interlocutor. This could explain why this particular version sounds unnatural and normally requires more material, such as the conjunct pero se me había olvidado 'but I had forgotten it'; however, the possibility for defocusing the presupposed noun clause is open and can be used when expressing E's not directly related to the hearer. Under the nonpresupposed reading, (35) reports the E expressed in the noun clause either with the [+ Truth value] representation assigned by the source (el profesor), or with the [- Truth value] representation assigned by the speaker (for the speaker the truth value of E is still to be confirmed). The first interpretation refers to (35a), and the second to (35b). In neither case is the speaker committed to the truth of the report. The choice of the Indicative in (35a) is based on the

[+ Truth value] representation implicitly attributed to the higher subject. The choice of the Subjunctive in (35b) is based on the [- Truth value] representation assigned to the E by the speaker.

5.2.2.2 Promises

(40) a.	Papá prometió que	vuelve.	(Pres. IND)
b.		volverá.	(Fut. IND)
c.		volvía.	(Impf. IND)
d.		volvería.	(Cond.)
e.		(?) vuelva.	(Pres. SUBJ)
f.		(?) volviera.	(Impf. SUBJ)
g.		*volvió.	(Pret. IND)
h.		*ha vuelto.	(Pres. Pf. IND)

'Dad promised he is coming/will come/
would come/*came/*has come back.'

The strings in (40) contain the matrix verb prometer 'to promise'. The event expressed in the noun clause is nonpre-supposed. The verb forms in the noun clause must be nonperfective (notice that the perfective forms in (40g-h) are ruled out). This means that the E in the noun clause must be unrealized at the moment of uttering the promise; one cannot promise to realize an event that has already been realized. (Commands and promises share the same semantic characteristic of representing events that are unrealized at the moment of expressing them).⁸

When the matrix sentence is not negated, the unmarked mood in noun clauses expressing promises is the Indicative, as (40a-d) show. The subjunctive forms in (40e-f) are unacceptable if the string is used in isolation; but they are acceptable when the sentence is followed by a conjunct like pero yo no creo 'but I don't believe (he will)'. The Indicative is correlated with the [+ Truth value] representation assigned by the person who makes the promise, i.e. the subject of promise. Promises, no matter how deceptive they might be, are claimed by the "promiser" to be true. The speaker reporting someone else's promise might or might not believe in the promise; in either case he usually chooses the [+ Truth value] representation assigned by the agent of the promise; but when he does not believe in the promise he can assign it a [- Truth value] representation.

When the matrix sentence is negated, either the Indicative or the Subjunctive can be chosen freely in the noun clause.

- (41) a. Papá no prometió que volvía. (IND)
 b. Papá no prometió que volviera. (SUBJ)
 'Dad didn't promise he would come back.'

Apparently either sentence can be uttered as a counterclaim to someone who has said that "Dad promised he would come back". In either case the relation between the matrix sentence and the noun clause is disclaimed. The noun clause

of (41a) appears to be a "quotation", while that of (41b) is the speaker's rendition of the same E. In the first case the speaker quotes a [+ Truth value] representation attributed to the higher subject by a person other than the speaker of (41a). In the second case, the speaker of (41b) assigns the E of the noun clause a [- Truth value] representation, since he does not know whether the E might be true or false, and he claims that the noun clause is not a promise.

5.2.2.3 Beliefs.

- (42) a. Yo sí creo que Dios existe. (IND)
b. Yo sí creo que Dios exista. (SUBJ)

'I do believe that God exists.'

Sentence (42) contains the matrix verb creer 'to believe', modified by the emphatic sí. This matrix sentence expresses a strong belief in the truth of the complement. In assertion-based analyses, the use of the Subjunctive in the noun clause is entirely unexpected (moreover, rejected); I find it entirely acceptable.

(42) is presumably expressed as a "reaction" after someone has said or suggested that the speaker (of (42)) does not believe in the truth of the E.

The noun clause in (42) is nonpresupposed. In (42a) the speaker has assigned the noun clause a [+ Truth value] representation which is interpreted positively by virtue of the positive value of the matrix sentence. Thus the noun clause

and the matrix sentence agree in content. (42b) poses a problem, since the emphatic sí of the matrix gives the impression that the E expressed in the noun clause must have a (positive) truth value for the speaker. In the analysis proposed here the Subjunctive has been associated with [- Truth value] in nonpresupposed (nonoptative) E's. The choice of the Subjunctive in sentences like (42b), then, appears to disagree in content with the matrix sentence, where a strong belief in the truth of the complement is expressed. The problem can be overcome, however, if we keep in mind that a strong belief does not require that the E of the noun clause must be assigned a [+ Truth value] representation, since the matrix and the noun clause enjoy a certain degree of independence. Notice that (42b) conveys a reading like 'God may or may not exist, but I do believe (perhaps hope) that he exists', and it is exactly this reading which is associated with the [- Truth value] specification.

5.2.2.4 Disbelief and doubt

(43) a. Boris no cree que Dios existe. (IND)

b. Boris no cree que Dios exista. (SUBJ)

'Boris doesn't believe that God exists.'

(44) a. Dudo que el acusado cometió ese delito. (IND)

b. Dudo que el acusado haya cometido ese delito. (SUBJ)

'I doubt that the defendant committed that crime.'

Sentence (43) contains the matrix verb no creer 'to not believe', and sentence (44) contains the matrix verb dudar 'to doubt'. Both of these matrix verbs cast doubt on the validity of the complement.

Assertion-based analyses reject the use of the Indicative in the noun clauses of sentences like (43) and (44); but I (like Lenz [1925]) find it acceptable. What happens here is that the unmarked mood in noun clauses of sentences like these is the Subjunctive, since it is naturally expected that the E will lack a truth value for the subject of no creer and dudar. Nevertheless these verbs also express the subject's attitude toward a claim made by someone else which has been assigned a [+ Truth value] representation, and which can be "quoted", so to speak. Thus, in the analysis proposed here, the Subjunctive is associated with the [- Truth value] specification attributed to the subject of the matrix sentence, and the Indicative is associated with the [+ Truth value] representation assigned to the clause by a person other than the subject of the matrix sentence.

If the subject of no creer and dudar is coreferent with the speaker, the truth of the E of the noun clause is obviously doubtful for the speaker; but if the subject of the matrix sentence is other than the speaker, the truth value that the noun clause might have for the speaker is not transparent.

When dudar is negated, as in (45), the E of the noun clause has a positive truth value for the higher subject.

- (45) a. Yo no dudo que Nixon es culpable. (IND)
b. Yo no dudo que Nixon sea culpable. (SUBJ)
'I don't doubt that Nixon is guilty.'

Assertion-based analyses reject the use of the Subjunctive in this type of noun clauses. I find it acceptable. The unmarked mood is, indeed the Indicative, since the E of the noun clause is [+ Truth value] for the subject of no dudar. Nevertheless, since sentences like (45b) are usually uttered in a discourse context as a reaction to someone's statement that the subject doubts X, the speaker is free to "quote" the [- Truth value] representation assigned to the E by the interlocutor.

5.2.2.5 Hypotheses

- (46) a. Sospecho que Miguel compró ese carro. (IND)
b. Sospecho que Miguel haya comprado ese carro. (SUBJ)
'I suspect that Miguel (has) bought that car.'

Sentence (46) contains the matrix verb sospechar 'to suspect' which denotes that the E represented in the noun clause is the subject's hypothesis, hence it is not presupposed. Neither could it be taken as an assertion of truth (in the sense of Terrel and Hooper [1972]), since the sentence conveys a strong element of doubt, and assertion and

doubt are two mutually exclusive notions. Assertion-based analyses, then, can account for the choice of the Subjunctive, but not for the choice of the Indicative, or vice versa, depending on whether the noun clause is considered either assertive or doubted, in the light of the meaning expressed in the whole sentence.

In our analysis both moods are allowed. Since the sentence as a whole expresses that the E of the noun clause lacks a truth value for the subject of the matrix sentence, it is to be expected that the unmarked mood in this type of noun clauses will be the Subjunctive. This appears to be the case. Nevertheless, since the noun clause enjoys a certain degree of independence from the matrix sentence, the noun clause can be assigned a [+ Truth value] (hence the Indicative) to convey a meaning of bias toward positive truth of the E.

The mood alternation, then, correlates with degrees of certainty about the truth of the E. The Indicative implies more certainty, and the Subjunctive less certainty about the truth of the E.

When the subject of sospechar is not coreferent with the speaker, the Indicative in the noun clause implies that the E is true for the speaker; the Subjunctive is less transparent for the speaker's assumption.

(47) a. Pedro sospecha que María se ve con Marcos. (IND)

b. Pedro sospecha que María se vea con Marcos. (SUBJ)

'Pedro suspects that Maria is/might be seeing Marcos.'

5.2.2.6 Summary. In the preceding sections, sentences containing the matrix verbs contar, prometer, creer, no creer, dudar, and sospechar were examined, and it was shown that the alternations of mood in the noun clauses embedded under them can not be explained in terms of assertion-based analyses, but they are explained in terms of the elements included in our primary system and the manipulative factors mentioned in Section 2.

It has also been stated that one mood or the other is unmarked in certain constructions. And that the noun clause enjoys a certain degree of independence from the matrix under which it is embedded, which allows for the choice of either mood to express certain semantic subtleties.

5.3 Fallacy. Sentences like (48) to (50) pose grave problems for assertion-based analyses, since it would be absolutely impossible to interpret the noun clause as either the speaker's assertion or the subject's assertion.

(48) a. Simulaban que estaban trabajando. (IND)

b. Simulaban que estuvieran trabajando. (SUBJ)

'They pretended they were working.'

(49) a. Luisa fingió que dormía. (IND)

b. ?Luisa fingió que durmiera. (SUBJ)

'Luisa feigned she was asleep.'

(50) a. Los González aparentan que son ricos. (IND)

b. Los González aparentan que sean ricos. (SUBJ)

c. Los González aparentan que fueran ricos. (SUBJ)

'The Gonzalezes pretend/give the impression
that they are rich.'

From the speaker's viewpoint, he cannot assert that the noun clause is true when the whole sentence expresses that the noun clause is a fallacy. From the subject's viewpoint, the noun clause cannot be an assertion, simply because the clause describes the subject's attitude, but does not quote a speech act by him.

Within an assertion-based analysis the Subjunctive (with a little imagination) could possibly be "explained" as the correlation of doubt or denial; but notice that the Subjunctive is of doubtful acceptability in (49b), where the verb of the noun clause is used nonstatively. In assertion-based analyses, the choice of the Indicative in these noun clauses, which occurs naturally, as (48) to (50) show, remains entirely unexplained.

In our analysis, the perceived E can be expressed with a [+ Truth value] representation, as in the (a) sentences above, or with a [- Truth value] representation, as in the other strings. In this analysis the Indicative is more

readily assigned a truth value (either positive or negative), which in the sentences under consideration turns out to be negative under the effect of the matrix semantic content of "fallacy". When the Subjunctive is chosen, in spite of the matrix verb expressing the idea of fallacy, the noun clause reads like a hypothesis fluctuating in truth value, and the sentence as a whole seems to concentrate on the qualification of the perceived E (i.e. on the idea expressed in the matrix verb) rather than on the truth value of the noun clause.

There seem to be more semantic subtleties involved in the choice of the Subjunctive in fallacious clauses. Unfortunately they are not entirely clear to me, and will remain unexplored.

5.4 Noun clauses embedded under the so-called ambiguous matrix verbs. In analyses in which the meaning of the noun clause is claimed to be obligatorily matched with the meaning of the matrix verb, it is not uncommon to set up classes of matrices according to both semantic and syntactic criteria. Semantically, certain verbs are assertive, like afirmar, asegurar, aseverar, and the like ('affirm', 'assert', etc.), others are matrix verbs of doubt or denial, such as dudar, no creer, negar, etc. ('doubt', 'not believe', 'deny', etc.), and others are verbs of commanding, such as mandar, ordenar, etc. ('command', 'order', etc.), and so on.

There is nothing wrong with this classification procedure. It is indeed necessary in order to establish natural semantic

classes of verbs that will participate in certain types of syntactic processes but not in others, or that are subject to certain co-occurrence restrictions, etc. Nevertheless, this kind of taxonomy has led some linguists (e.g. Stockwell et al. [1965]) to cross-classify certain matrix verbs that can co-occur with more than one type of noun clause, thus implicitly claiming that they are semantically and/or syntactically ambiguous. It has been suggested (as pointed out in Rivero [1971]) that each of these matrix verbs is in fact two separate verbs that happen to be homophonous.

Among the so-called ambiguous matrix verbs we find items like the following: avisar 'to warn', decir 'to say'/'to tell', gritar 'to shout', escribir 'to write', contestar 'to answer', insistir 'to insist', hacer señas 'to make gestures', convencer 'to convince', admitir 'to admit'/'to accept', confiar 'to trust'/'to hope firmly', creer 'to believe'/'to think', sentir 'to feel'/'to feel sorry', es importante 'it's important', es bueno 'it's good', etc.

Matrix verbs like avisar, insistir, hacer señas, escribir, are claimed to be both "reporting" and "imperative" matrices, simply because they co-occur with either declarative or imperative noun clauses.

In the view expounded here, these matrices will be unambiguous in semantic terms, and assumed to be specified in the lexicon as to the types of E's they can co-occur with (just as every matrix verb would be). This means, then, that

the ambiguity of these matrices is only apparent, and comes entirely from the types of noun clauses that can be embedded in them. Thus insistir is one verb that conveys the meaning of "repetition" or "insistence", but which has no inherent imperative content. This verb will be specified in the lexicon as being able to co-occur with either presupposed or nonpresupposed events in general; perhaps it could as well be left unspecified since it can co-occur with the expression of all types of E's, and have a convention to the effect that unspecified matrix verbs function thusly.

Of all the verbs listed above, perhaps sentir 'to feel'/'to feel sorry' is the only one that seems to be ambiguous, having a reading of 'sensorial perception' and a reading of 'feeling of sympathy'. The ambiguity, however, is superficial. Sentir always means personal experience of feeling, either physical or mental and animic. What happens is that in the 'sympathy' reading the abstract noun pesar 'sorrow' (or tristeza 'sadness') is usually deleted (but it can be actualized); its opposite, alegría 'happiness' cannot be deleted. Thus we have sentences like

(51) Siento (pesar de) que te vayas.

(52) Siento alegría de que te vayas.

Lit. 'I feel (sorrow)/I feel gladness that
you're leaving.'

5.4.1 Unmarked interpretations of mood. The choice of mood in the noun clauses embedded under matrix sentences containing items like those mentioned above can be explained in terms of the analysis proposed here. Of course, interpretive ambiguity can arise. Nevertheless, when there is ambiguity, there is a preferred (unmarked) interpretation associated with each mood. For instance, (53a) is more readily interpreted as containing a nonpresupposed nonoptative noun clause, and (53b) is more readily interpreted as containing an imperative noun clause.

(53) a. Insisto en que María canta mañana! (IND)

b. Insisto en que María cante mañana! (SUBJ)

'I insist that María sings/sing tomorrow!'

Sentence (53a) can also be interpreted as a command, depending on the context. It will be an emphatic command. (Cf. Section 5.2.1.2.)

This polarization of interpretation of the noun clauses seems to be a consequence of the nature of the matrix verb. Since the matrix verb is neutral in terms of signaling optativity or nonoptativity, etc., the Spanish speaker appeals to the mood alternation to signal the contrast.

6.0 Summary and conclusion

In this chapter, a concrete proposal has been made to account for and explain the mood alternations in Spanish noun clauses. This analysis contains a primary system composed of

two types of factors: Cognitive and impressionistic. The cognitive factors refer to the nature of E's (or their truth); and the impressionistic factors are related to special effects that the speaker wants to achieve. Also, some factors have been considered which explain certain preferences of choice of one mood rather than the other. Some of these factors are of a pragmatic nature, such as "interpersonal relations" (or "manners"), and discourse context; others have to do with implicit attribution of application of the primary system either to the higher subject, or to the speaker, or to someone else.

Most of the Spanish facts involving mood alternations have been examined in the light of the analysis proposed here, at the same time comparing our system with assertion-based analysis. It has been shown that our analysis is better equipped to provide explanations for the mood alternations.

7.0 Final remark

Our system is more complex than any other system known to me. Nevertheless, it has been shown in Chapter I that simpler analyses are unable to explain the mood alternations in an accurate way, simply because they ignore many factors which, as has been seen in this study, do play an important role in the choice of mood. Obviously, the matter of choice of mood in Spanish is not so simple as most linguists have thought.

Footnotes to Chapter II

¹Verbalize is used ambiguously here, meaning both 'to put in words', and 'to express with a verb'. I assume that the verb is the axis of the expression of an E.

²In the sense of "logical presupposition" in Keenan [1971], or "factivity" in Kiparsky and Kiparsky [1971].

³It may seem that (4a) and (4b) are not "minimal pairs", as R. P. Stockwell suggested to me in personal communication. The apparent disparity comes from the fact that in the noun clause of (4a) a simple verb form has been used, while in the noun clause of (4b) a compound verb form has been used. The sentences, however, are semantically equivalent. The simple verb form in the noun clause of (4a) is a preterit, i.e. a perfective verb form, and the verb form in the noun clause of (4b) is also perfective. I did not use the simple Past Subjunctive (insultaran) in (4b) because although this form is possible there it is nonperfective in form; it could be interpreted as a perfective or as a nonperfective verb, but its perfective reading would be assigned by the context and not marked in the verb form itself. More pairs like (4a) and (4b) will be found throughout this chapter.

⁴Optative E's must be divided into imperatives and non-imperatives (or desiderative) in order to explain the difference in verb aspect in noun clauses: Imperatives can take only nonperfective verb forms, while nonimperatives can take both perfective and nonperfective verb forms. Other than that, noun clauses expressing both imperative and nonimperative E's follow the same pattern in the choice of mood; this is why in this proposal both imperative and nonimperative E's are subsumed under optative E's.

⁵The [+/- Truth value] features were suggested to me by Paul Schachter, for which I am grateful.

⁶For instance in Kiparsky and Kiparsky [1968], Fillmore [1969a] and [1969b], Langendoen [1971], Keenan [1971], Terrell and Hooper [1972]. Only the last item makes specific reference to Spanish.

⁷The Subjunctive noun clause, however, can be assigned an emphatic intonation contour. This version, however, is not so emphatic as the indicative version.

⁸This common property suggests that promises may be taken as a subset of Imperative E's, that is, "self-imperative" E's. In fact, when one makes a promise he imposes on himself the realization of the E. And it is "imposition of the realization of the E" that characterizes imperatives.

Chapter III

On Negative Raising

0. Introduction

In standard transformational analyses,¹ pairs of sentences like (a)-(b), in (1) and (2), are assumed to be derived from a common underlying structure which is similar to the (a) sentences.

- (1) a. I think Jack doesn't speak Spanish.
b. I don't think Jack speaks Spanish.
- (2) a. It's likely that Bill won't come back.
b. It isn't likely that Bill will come back.

The rule that presumably derives the (b) sentences from the underlying structures of the (a) sentences is known as "NEG-raising" or "NEG-transportation". It moves to a matrix clause the NEG particle not generated in an embedded sentence. Its application is optional. It is restricted to apply on sentences containing higher predicates of a limited set, such as think, believe, seem, suppose, likely.

0.1 This type of analysis has been adopted by some linguists in the description of Spanish. One particular example is Rivero [1969b; 1970a; 1971]. In Rivero [1971] two operations are distinguished in which negation is involved: (A) Negative transportation (the process just described above),

which applies when the higher predicates belong to the class of pensar, creer, parecer ('think', 'believe', 'seem'); and (B) Negative incorporation, which Rivero [1971:316] describes as "the rule which applies across sentence boundaries to insert negative features in certain constituents". An example of "Negative Incorporation" would be (3) (Rivero's example (23a)).

(3) No confiaba en que estuviera diciendo nada.

'I was not confident that he was saying anything.'

Rivero explains that since confiar is not one of the verbs that allow for NEG-transportation, the negative particle no which appears in the higher sentence could not have originated in the underlying structure of the embedded clause. Nada 'nothing' (which appears as the object of the embedded clause--TNO) is a lexical item which in order to be grammatical in simple sentences must precede the verb if there is no other negative word which precedes that verb. (Rivero's examples (24) and (25), p. 316).

- | | | |
|--------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| (4) a. | No como nada. | 'I don't eat anything.' |
| b. | Nada como. | 'I eat nothing.' |
| c. | Nunca como nada. | 'Never do I eat anything.' |
| d. | No como nada nunca. | 'I don't ever eat anything.' |

- (5) a. *Como nada.
b. *Como nada nunca.
c. *Como nunca nada.

Rivero concludes that since in sentences like (3) NEG-transportation cannot have applied, and since there is no negation in the same simplex as nada, the grammaticality of this type of sentence is to be explained as the result of Negative incorporation.²

It seems to me that the process of NEG-incorporation is indeed a process of Spanish, as evidenced by sentence (3) and the facts in (4) and (5). But NEG-transportation is extremely doubtful.

In the ensuing sections I will attempt to show that NEG-raising (or NEG-transportation) cannot be a rule of the grammar of Spanish. I will claim instead that the grammar of Spanish contains "NEG-extension" rules, which are very similar to Rivero's NEG-incorporation; these rules will explain in a unified way the two types of processes identified as NEG-transportation and NEG-incorporation. Also NEG-extension will allow us to capture semantic subtleties (pointed out throughout the ensuing discussion) which cannot be explained in terms of NEG-transportation.

1.0 Arguments for NEG-raising

The arguments presented in the literature for the validity of the NEG-raising rule are both semantic and syntactic. I

will examine some of them and show that they are weak, and that the existence of the rule cannot be proven on their evidence.

1.1 Semantic argument. The main semantic argument for the existence of the NEG-raising rule is that pairs of sentences like (6a) and (6b) are synonymous (at least under one reading).

(6) a. Creo que Esperanza no viene³ mañana.

'I think Esperanza is not coming tomorrow.'

b. No creo que Esperanza venga mañana.

'I don't think Esperanza is coming tomorrow.'

One of the alleged readings of (6b) is exactly the one expressed in (6a). The noun clause is negated. The negation of the matrix sentence in (6b) does not negate the act of thinking but the object of the thinking, the lower sentence. Since the underlying structure provides the input for the semantic component, and the reading of the noun clause in (6b) is negative, it must be the case that NEG is generated in the noun clause, just as in (6a), and then raised to the higher sentence by the NEG-raising rule.

At first glance, this argument is persuasive. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out⁴ correctly that pairs of sentences of this type are not perfectly synonymous. When the negation occurs in the higher sentence "there is greater uncertainty in the speaker's mind about the negation in the

(9) Pedro alega que él no rompió el florero.

'Pedro argues that he did not break the vase.'

(10) Yo sostengo que Rosa no fué al cine.

'I contend that Rosa did not go to the movies.'

In other words, a matrix phrase expressing denial of the truth of the noun clause appears to assign a negative coloring to the noun clause. This, however, is not evidence that (7) and (8) are derived from their counterparts (9) and (10), since aside from the "negative coloring" in the noun clauses in (7) and (8), these sentences are not paraphrases of (9) and (10). Apparently, then, the partial synonymy in sentences like (6a) and (6b) is also a case of "negative coloring" of the complement of (6b).

A semantic argument based on partial synonymy cannot prove the existence of the NEG-raising rule, unless it is accepted as a general principle that transformations can change meaning, either by addition or by subtraction of semantic material. This principle, however, would contradict the theoretical tenet that the underlying structure provides the input for semantic interpretation.

1.2 Syntactic arguments. The main syntactic arguments for NEG-raising are, for the most part, based on the privilege of occurrence of expressions like until, lift a finger, etc. Also, on "affective" expressions like either, too, neither. And on tag-questions.

Some of these arguments have been borrowed in Spanish analyses,⁵ to make a case for NEG-raising in this language. In the ensuing sections I will examine arguments based on hasta 'until', and on idiomatic expressions like mover un dedo 'to lift a finger', palabra de 'a word of', gota de 'a drop of'. I will show that these arguments cannot be conclusive.

1.2.1 Hasta 'until'.⁶ In "standard" Spanish, hasta can be used in time adverbial phrases, either in sentences expressing durative⁷ events (as in (11)), or in sentences containing negated nondurative verbs (as in (12)).

(11) Los buses salen cada media hora hasta las 3 p.m.

'Buses leave every half hour until 3 p.m.'

(12) El bus no sale hasta las dos y media.

'The bus won't leave until half past two.'

Hasta is not used in nonnegated sentences expressing nondurative events, in "standard" Spanish. Thus, (13) and (14) are unacceptable.

(13) *El bus sale hasta las dos y media.

*'The bus leaves until half past two.'

(14) *Marcos volvió hasta las cuatro de la tarde.

*'Marcos came back until four in the afternoon.'

In standard Spanish, strings expressing nondurative (or punctual) events, and containing an adverbial phrase of time marked by hasta, are grammatical only if the string is negative. Both the NEG and the time adverbial must be dominated by the same S in their deep structure.

In some dialects of Spanish, strings like (15), below, are acceptable. In this case, the negation and the time adverbial phrase are dominated by different S's in the surface structure. This has been taken as evidence for a NEG-raising rule.

(15) No cree que el bus salga hasta las dos y media.

'He doesn't believe that the bus leaves until half past two.'

It is claimed that the NEG particle no must have been generated not in the matrix sentence, but in the sentence containing the time adverbial. Thus, (15) must be derived from the underlying structure of (16).

(16) Cree que el bus no salga hasta las dos y media.

'He believes the bus doesn't leave until half past two.'

This argument is significantly weakened by two facts. First, not all of the Spanish speakers accept (15) as a well formed sentence.⁸ I, for one, find strings like (15) to be awkward, and find it difficult to interpret them as paraphrases of sentences like (16). And second, "standard"

descriptions have chosen to ignore that in some dialects, strings like (17) are not uncommon.

(17) Ramiro regresó hasta la madrugada.

? 'Ramiro returned until dawn.'

(17) is used with the reading of the standard sentence, Ramiro no regresó hasta la madrugada. In (17) no negation is present, but hasta has been used although the sentence expresses a nondurative event. This fact suggests very strongly that a semantic change has occurred in those dialects that allow sentences like (17). And this should not be surprising. If hasta is used in the expression of durative events to convey the idea of extension over a broad time span, as in (18), its meaning could be extended to convey also the idea of long delay for the nondurative event to take place.

(18) Juan estudió hasta la madrugada.

'Juan studied until dawn.'

Paul Schachter (personal communication) has suggested to me that another possibility for the analysis of constructions like (17) is that the dialects that accept it delete no because it is redundant. This possibility, however, seems not to reflect the speaker's "intuition" about the meaning of the sentence. A certain speaker of Spanish "explained" to me that "it makes no sense to say that Ramiro no regresó, when

what is meant is that he did return". If this speaker's explanation describes the logic behind sentences like (17), in those dialects in which they are acceptable, it seems to be the case that the privilege of occurrence of hasta is less restricted in these dialects. In other words, hasta can occur in time adverbial phrases dominated by an S which dominates not a negated punctual verb, but a nonnegated punctual verb.

If this is the case then the NEG that appears in the matrix S of (15) need not be generated in the lower S. Hasta and NEG can be generated in different S's.

It seems to me that (15), No cree que el bus salga hasta las dos y media, would not be synonymous with the "standard" (16), Cree que el bus no salga hasta las dos y media; (15) would be, perhaps, the negation of the "nonstandard" (19).

(19) (?) Cree que el bus salga hasta las dos y media.

? 'He believes the bus leaves until half past two.'

In other words, I would claim that the matrix sentence in (15) expresses a negative attitude toward the truth of the embedded clause rather than a positive belief regarding the event expressed in the noun clause.

If my interpretation is correct, and I believe it is, then the argument based on hasta cannot constitute evidence for NEG-raising. Even if my interpretation is incorrect, we still have a double reason to doubt the validity of a

NEG-raising analysis to explain strings like (15): (a) those dialects in which strings like (17) are acceptable; and (b) those dialects in which strings like (15) are unacceptable.

1.2.2 Idiomatic expressions. Similar to the argument based on hasta 'until', are arguments based on the privilege of occurrence of idiomatic expressions like palabra de... 'a word of...', mover un dedo 'to lift a finger', gota de... 'a drop of...'. It is normally assumed that these expressions must be constituents of a negated sentence (in the underlying structure), in order for the sentence to be grammatical.

(20) a. Ligia no mencionó palabra del asunto.

'Ligia didn't mention a word about the matter.'

b. *Ligia mencionó palabra del asunto.

*'Ligia mentioned a word about the matter.'

(21) a. Lola no movió un dedo para ayudarme.

'Lola didn't lift a finger to help me.'

b. *Lola movió un dedo para ayudarme.⁹

*'Lola lifted a finger to help me.'

(22) a. No hemos probado gota de vino.

'We haven't tasted a drop of wine.'

b. *Hemos probado gota de vino.

*'We have tasted a drop of wine.'

According to this, it is argued that the negation that appears in the matrix sentence of the well formed (23) could not have been generated in the underlying structure of the matrix sentence, but rather in the embedded S's, and then moved by the NEG-raising rule; otherwise the sentences in (23) would be ungrammatical.

- (23) a. No cree que Ligia hubiera mencionado palabra del asunto.

'He doesn't think Ligia has spoken a word about the matter.'

- b. No cree que Lola hubiera movido un dedo para ayudarme.

'He doesn't think Lola would have lifted a finger to help me.'

- c. No cree que hayamos probado gota de vino.

'He doesn't think we have tasted a drop of wine.'

At first glance this argument is convincing. Nevertheless, it is considerably weakened when sentences like (24), below, are taken into consideration. In these well formed sentences there is no overt manifestation of a negative morpheme. Nevertheless, the idiomatic expressions under consideration have been used.

- (24) a. Si mueven un dedo, disparen a matar!

'If they lift a finger, shoot to kill!'

- b. Si mencionas palabra del asunto, no te vuelvo a contar nada.

'If you mention a word about the matter, I will never again tell you anything.'

c. Si prueban gota de vino, quedan despedidos.

'If you all taste a drop of wine, you're fired.'

It should be pointed out, however, that the sentences introduced by si 'if' (conditional), contain a negative implication. They are equivalent to

(25) a. Que no muevan un dedo, o ...

'They shouldn't lift a finger, or ...'

b. No menciones palabra del asunto, o ...

'Don't mention a word about the matter, or ...'

c. No prueben gota de vino, o ...

'Don't taste a drop of wine, or ...'

This negative implication might be taken as evidence that the underlying structures of the sentences in (24) contain a NEG, i.e. that the sentences in (24) are derived from underlying structures similar to the strings in (25). But if this were the case, as Paul Schachter pointed out to me (personal communication), how would one generate negative si clauses such as (26)?

(26) Si los obreros no mueven un dedo para hacer el trabajo, aviseme.

'If the workers don't lift a finger to do the work, let me know.'

Sentences like (26) have a positive implication, i.e. the speaker of (26) expects the workers to act; however, there is no corresponding positive construction for (26). Its possible paraphrase is unacceptable.

(27) *Que los obreros muevan un dedo, o ...

*'The workers should lift a finger, or ...'

The problem with sentences like (24) is that there is no overt negation that could provide the proper environment to explain the acceptability of the use of these idiomatic expressions in these sentences. The problem is even greater if we consider that each of the sentences in (24) is an If ... then construction where the then (or consequential) event is subject to a positive (not negative) condition:

(28) If NP does X, then E will take place.

And in spite of this positive condition, the idiomatic phrases have been used, and the strings are well formed sentences.

By the same token, these idiomatic expressions can be used in questions like

(29) Tú crees que yo hablo palabra de Chino?

'Do you think that I speak a word of Chinese?'

(30) Tú crees que yo no hablo palabra de Chino?

'Do you think that I don't speak a word of Chinese?'

In these sentences we face the same problems we face in sentences (24) and (26). (29) and (30) express different viewpoints. (29) contains a negative implication, i.e. I don't speak a word of Chinese. And (30) contains a positive implication, i.e. I do speak (some) Chinese.

The facts thus far examined suggest that in complex sentences these idiomatic expressions need not be generated in the same S where NEG is generated; moreover, that they need not be generated in a negated S. Thus, their privilege of occurrence in complex sentences does not constitute evidence for a NEG-raising rule. This claim is reinforced by the existence of sentences like (31).

(31) a. No lograron que yo probara gota de vino.

'They didn't succeed in making me taste a drop of wine.'

b. No pudimos hacer que Manuel mencionara palabra del asunto.

'We couldn't make Manuel mention a word about the matter.'

Since the matrix verbs in these sentences are not verbs that allow for NEG-raising, the negation in the matrix must have originated in the underlying structure of the matrix sentence. Nevertheless, the idiomatic expressions under consideration are used in the lower clause, which is nonnegated, and the sentences are well formed.

In brief, the privilege of occurrence of these idiomatic expressions in complex sentences does not support the existence of a NEG-raising rule.

2.0 An argument against NEG-raising

Sentences containing negations both in the higher and in the lower sentences are extremely damaging for analyses based on NEG-raising.

(32) Yo no pienso que ella no sea inteligente.

'I don't think that she isn't intelligent.'

(33) No es probable que no haya terminado.

'It isn't likely that he hasn't finished.'

The NEG-raising rule is assumed to apply just in case the higher S does not contain a negation. This assumption is faced with one major problem of inconsistency in the generation of NEG. On the one hand, it does not allow NEG to be generated in the underlying structure of the higher sentence, if the complex sentence contains only one NEG. On the other hand, it allows NEG to be generated in the underlying structure of the higher sentence, if another NEG is generated in the underlying structure of the lower sentence. One wonders why there should be two different processes for NEG to be inserted in the higher sentence.

If we were to maintain that NEG-raising is a rule of Spanish, for instance, in order to give respectability to the claim it would be necessary to maintain that the negation which appears in the higher sentences in (32) and (33) is there because it was raised from the lower sentences. This would be more consistent with the "performative" approach in Lakoff (1969). For instance, since in (32) the matrix verb would be used as a performative verb (in Lakoff's analysis),¹⁰ it makes no sense to negate it in underlying structure. At the same time, by deriving (32) and (33)

transformationally, the description would present a unified process of NEG-raising.

According to these considerations, the underlying structures of the embedded sentences in (32) and (33) would contain a double NEG:

(32') [[Yo pienso [NEG NEG ella es inteligente]]

(33') [[Es probable [NEG NEG él haya terminado]]

Unless NEG-raising were an obligatory rule, (32') and (33') would allow us to derive strings like (34) and (35), below, which are, if not ungrammatical, at least extremely clumsy.

(34) ? Yo pienso que ella no es no inteligente.

? 'I think that she isn't not intelligent.'

(35) ? Es probable que él no haya no terminado.

? 'It is likely that he hasn't not finished.'

Even if these strings could be generated in the deep grammar of Spanish, the semantic contrast between a negated matrix sentence and a nonnegated one would be missed. When the matrix sentence is not negated, the lower sentence is interpreted as the higher's subject opinion. When the matrix sentence is negated, this expresses the higher subject's disagreement with someone else's opinion represented in the lower sentence. Thus, if the underlying structure is to

provide the input for semantic interpretation, NEG must be generated in the higher sentences in (32) and (33)--and also in the lower sentences. If this is so, there is nothing in the grammar that could prevent generating NEG in the higher sentences uniformly.

It may be concluded, then, that NEG-raising has nothing to do with the derivation of the sentences we have examined in the foregoing discussion. There is no strong evidence that a NEG-raising rule exists in Spanish. And there is reason to believe that it does not exist.

3.0 Alternative analysis

According to the foregoing discussion, the NEG-raising rule turns out not to be the best way to explain the partial semantic relation that holds between the (a)-(b) pairs in sentences like (36) and (37).

(36) a. Creo que Pedro no venga.

'I think Pedro won't come.'

b. No creo que Pedro venga.

'I don't think Pedro will come.'

(37) a. Es probable que María no asista a la fiesta.

'It is likely that Maria won't attend the party.'

b. No es probable que María asista a la fiesta.

'It isn't likely that Maria will attend the party.'

One thing is clear: When the negation appears in a

higher sentence which contains a predicate of the type represented in (36) and (37), the semantic value of negativity of the lower sentence is opposite to its surface negation. That is, if on the one hand, the lower sentence does not contain a NEG particle, it will be assigned a negative reading. On the other hand, if the lower sentence contains a NEG particle, it will be assigned a positive reading. When the higher sentence is not negated, the semantic value of negativity of the lower sentence is directly marked in the surface structure of the lower sentence. This can be represented in the following schema:

(38)	<u>Higher S</u>	<u>Lower S</u>	<u>Reading for Lower S</u>
(a)	+ NEG	- NEG	+ Negative
(b)	+ NEG	+ NEG	- Negative
(c)	- NEG	- NEG	- Negative
(d)	- NEG	+ NEG	+ Negative

3.1 Proposal. I propose that NEG is generated by the base component either in the higher S, or in the lower S, or in both the higher and the lower S's, or in none of the S's.¹¹ The semantic interpretation of the negativity value of the lower sentence (which will be taken as the negativity value in the opinion of the higher subject) will be assigned by interpretive rules along the lines of the schema represented in (38) above. I will make no attempt to formalize these interpretive rules; I will provide, instead, an informal version of them:

- (39) (A) If no NEG is generated in the higher S, the negativity value of the lower S is its face value, and it is to be attributed directly to the higher subject.
- (B) If NEG is generated in the higher S, the scope of NEG is extended to the lower S. The negativity value of the lower S is opposite to its face value, and it is attributed only indirectly to the higher subject; the negativity value is, then, implied (not overt as in (A)).

The advantage of this proposal over NEG-raising is that it explains both the partial synonymy of pairs of sentences like those to be examined in (40) to (43), and at the same time it explains their semantic differences. The partial synonymy is captured in the negativity value assigned by the interpretive rules. The semantic difference is captured by the different underlying representations (associated with different viewpoints). Let us examine some examples. First, the pair of sentences (40) and (41).

(40) Creo que Ernesto no se case pronto.

'I think Ernesto won't get married soon.'

(41) No creo que Ernesto se case pronto.

'I don't think Ernesto will get married soon.'

By virtue of the interpretive rules in (39) the opinion expressed in (40) and (41) is that the event of the complement will not take place soon. The complement is interpreted negatively in both instances. The expression of the opinion, however, is different in each case. While the negativity value for the complement is assigned in a straightforward manner in (40), the negativity value for the complement is much less direct in (33). In other words, the negative opinion is overt in (40), but implied in (41). And this difference is associated with the generation of the NEG in different sentences in (40) and (41).

Let us now examine sentences (42) and (43).

(42) Creo que Ernesto se case pronto.

'I think that Ernesto will get married soon.'

(43) No creo que Ernesto no se case pronto.

'I don't think that Ernesto won't get married soon.'

This pair of sentences is partially synonymous, in that the opinion of the higher subject is positive (nonnegative), i.e. that the event of the complement might take place soon. Here again, the expression of the opinion is different in each case. It is direct in (42), but only implied in (43), which is nicely represented in the different structures of these sentences.

In standard analyses, (42) and (43) would be entirely different, since their underlying structures are different.

Their semantic relation would be accidental. In this interpretive analysis, both their partial synonymy and their dissimilarity are explained.

One further advantage of this proposal over the standard analysis based on NEG-raising is that it explains as a single process the facts that have been discussed in the literature as cases of NEG-raising, and the cases which have been explained as NEG-incorporation in, for instance, Rivero [1971]. (See section 0.1 in this chapter.) Sentences like (44) and (45) would be derived in a similar fashion, according to my proposal.

(44) No creía que hubieras hecho nada.

'I didn't think you had done anything.'

(45) No confiaba en que hubieras hecho nada.

'I wasn't confident that you had done anything.'

The underlying structures of these sentences may be represented as in (44') and (45').

(44') [[No creía [tú hubieras hecho NP $\begin{bmatrix} -\text{Def} \\ +\text{PRO} \end{bmatrix}$]]]

(45') [[No confiaba [tú hubieras hecho NP $\begin{bmatrix} -\text{Def} \\ +\text{PRO} \end{bmatrix}$]]]

The negation no will be generated in the underlying structure of the higher S, in both cases. According to (39B), the

scope of NEG is extended to the lower S. This means that NEG features are assigned to the lower S, thus making it equivalent to a negated S. This causes the (indefinite PRO) NP object of the lower sentence to be actualized as nada, which would not be grammatical if the sentence is not negated (cf. Section 0.1).

(46) *Tu hubieras hecho nada.

If nada is grammatical in (45), where NEG-raising is not applicable because confiar does not belong to the set of verbs that allow it, and it is also grammatical in (44), there can be no objection to treating both cases as a unified process of NEG-extension.

3.2 Possible objection. It might be objected that in underlying structures in which NEG is generated in the higher sentence, it is claimed that the verb (i.e. the act expressed by it) is denied, and that this is nonsensical. Lakoff [1969], for instance, claims that in a sentence like (47) the act of thinking cannot be negated because think is used as a "performative" verb (and performative verbs, by definition, are always positive).

(47) I don't think Bob is coming tonight.

This possible objection is falsifiable if, (i) we note that think is not in fact a performative verb (as pointed out in footnote 10), and (ii) we assume that it is exactly the

negation of the verb of the higher sentence which provides the difference in meaning between pairs of sentences like those illustrated in (48).

(48) a. No supongo que se haya robado el balón.

'I don't suppose he has stolen the ball.'

b. Supongo que no se haya robado el balón.

'I suppose he hasn't stolen the ball.'

In (48a), the speaker claims, in fact, that he makes no supposition that the (positively rendered) complement is true. In (48b), the speaker claims that he does make the supposition that the (negatively rendered) complement might be true. And these differences, whether purely semantic or pragmatic, must be captured in the underlying representations of these sentences.

4.0 Conclusion

If my interpretation of sentences containing the NEG in the higher sentences represents in some way the speaker's viewpoint (or intuitions), then NEG-raising is not the best way to explain the facts. An analysis that makes use of NEG-raising would obscure the semantic contrasts I have pointed out throughout this chapter. Sentences (40) and (41) would be derived from a common underlying structure, which means that they are simply paraphrases. And sentences like (42) and (43), which are derived from different underlying

structures, but which are synonymous in negativity value, would be only accidentally related, if at all. In an interpretive approach, the similarities and the differences can be captured in a natural way. The latter analysis, then, is to be preferred.

Footnotes to Chapter III

¹The source of the NEG-raising analysis in TG is Klima [1959]. It is adopted by Fillmore [1963], and in most standard descriptions.

²Rivero [1971] argues that both of these rules can apply only if the embedded clause is a subjunctive structure. This is inaccurate. In the light of the analysis I propose in Chapter II, the types of clauses in which these rules might be claimed to apply would be clauses representing nonpre-supposed nonoptative E's, and they can be either Indicative or Subjunctive in surface structure:

(i) No creo que él dijo eso. (IND)

(ii) No creo que él haya dicho eso. (SUBJ)

'I don't believe he said that.'

The Subjunctive is normally preferred in the noun clauses of sentences like these, but this is a natural consequence of the connotations conveyed by the sentences as wholes. The matrix sentence expresses the higher subject's attitude of "disbelief" about the truth of the complement; and the noun clause is the representation of the E object of the attitude. If the E of the noun clause is assigned a [+ Truth value] representation (i.e. an indicative verb form) the sentence as a whole expresses that, for the higher subject, the complement is false (or "a lie"); therefore the Indicative is "politely" avoided. If the E of the noun clause is assigned a [- Truth value] representation (a subjunctive verb form), the sentence as a whole expresses that although the higher subject does not believe the complement to be true he takes no stand about its falsity, either. The Subjunctive reduces the connotation to mere uncertainty about the truth (or falsity) of the complement, which is less "rude" than the connotation conveyed by the Indicative. This is why the Subjunctive is the "unmarked" mood in this type of sentence. But, again, the choice of the Indicative is legitimate in the grammar of Spanish in these cases.

³Notice that (6a) contains an indicative verb form in the noun clause, while (6b) contains a subjunctive verb form. (6b) could also be rendered with an indicative verb form, as No creo que Esperanza viene mañana. In this case the speaker does not accept the complement as true. The

complement is, presumably, an assertion not attributed to the higher subject. This does not alter the claim made by Bolinger (see below, footnote 4) that when the negation occurs in the higher sentence, there is greater uncertainty in the speaker's mind about the negation in the lower sentence. He does not believe the complement is true, but he does not deny it directly.

⁴Bolinger, in letters to G. Lakoff reported in R. Lakoff [1969].

⁵E.g. Maria L. Rivero (op. cit., Section 0.1 above). Tag-question formation is not relevant for Spanish. Also, the nature of "affective" expressions is little understood as yet; I will not discuss these arguments in this study.

⁶Lakoff [1969] attributes to M. Kajita an argument for NEG-raising based on until. The description of privilege of occurrence of hasta, presented above, is essentially that of until in standard English provided by Lakoff [1969].

⁷Durative is used here as a cover term; it includes iterative events, which would be the case of sentence (11). Salir 'to leave' is a perfective verb, or a punctual verb, i.e. the event cannot be prolonged indefinitely; but it can occur in cycles, and the sum of cycles forms a durative event.

⁸This has been pointed out by Lakoff [1969], in relation to a similar construction in English.

⁹Strings like this are unacceptable if intended metaphorically, not in their literal sense.

¹⁰Lakoff misuses the term "performative". Cf. Cattell [1973]. If think (pensar) were a performative verb, it would be acceptable to introduce it with hereby, as true performative verbs, such as pronounce, can.

I hereby pronounce you man and wife.

*I hereby think you're crazy.

¹¹This agrees with Stockwell et al. [1973].

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