

NPI-Licensing and Focus Movement
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Association with Focus by Movement. This paper presents new evidence in favor of the movement approach to focus association. The movement theory (cf. Chomsky, 1976) assumes that ‘only’ takes two syntactic arguments, a restrictor and a scope (1). This configuration can be derived by focus movement (2). Association into islands can be accounted for by positing pied piping of the entire island (Drubig, 1994). The actual focus *within* the island can be narrowed down by restricting the set of alternatives (Krifka (1996, 2004) following Rooth (1992a)). The in-situ approach (Rooth, 1985, 1992b) assumes that ‘only’ takes a single argument, and the truth conditional focal effects come about by restricting the alternative set (cf. Herburger (2000) for a different in-situ approach).

NPI-Licensing and ‘only’ ‘Only’ licenses NPIs in its scope but not in its restrictor. This seems surprising at first, since ‘only’ is not downward entailing in either environment. von Stechow (1999) reconciles the occurrence of NPIs in the scope of ‘only’ with the theory of NPI licensing based on downward entailment (Ladusaw, 1979) by invoking a weaker notion of entailment: Strawson Entailment. A Strawson entails B if, given that the presuppositions of B are met and A is true, one can infer B. ‘Only’ is Downward Strawson entailing in its scope but not in its restrictor (3).


No NPIs within the restrictor. Consider now a new observation about gaps in the distribution of NPIs. The examples in (4) illustrate that NPIs are not licensed in the parts of the DP that are not in focus, even though Strawson inferences to subsets are valid in those environments. The proposed explanation is that the *entire* DP is the restrictor of ‘only’, not just the focus. The NPIs are not c-commanded by a downward entailing operator. The downward-monotonicity of those environments is due to the particular alternatives considered in the context. Contextually induced downward monotonicity does not license NPIs, only c-commanding DE operators do. An NPI can only occur in the restrictor of ‘only’ when there is an additional DE-operator within the restrictor that licenses it (5). These NPIs are then also licensed even when ‘only’ is omitted (6) (cf. Horn (1996); von Stechow (1997); Beaver and Clark (2002)).

Predictions of the Movement Theory: The focus movement theory assumes that when ‘only’ attaches to its scope, focus movement renders (2) at LF by \bar{A} -movement. This makes three predictions for NPI licensing: When ‘only’ associates with a head, the entire *XP* has to be pied piped and becomes the restrictor of ‘only’ as a whole. There is no \bar{A} -*head*-movement. Association with a head should then not license an NPI within the same constituent (7). This prediction is borne out (8, 9, 10). The second prediction is that association with a constituent in an island cannot license NPIs *within the same island*, since the entire island pied pipes to become the restrictor of ‘only’ (11). Again, the prediction is borne out (12) (it is crucial to control for confounding intervention effects (cf. Guerzoni, 2004)). Third, if ‘only’ associates with an *XP* that *can* move (13), then the NPI should be licensed elsewhere in the sentence. This is illustrated in (14). More generally, cases of NPIs licensed by ‘only’ that appear to be in its complement must according to the present approach actually involve association with a constituent that moves, creating a configuration where the NPI is in the scope, and not the restrictor of ‘only’ (cf. examples in Beaver and Clark (2002), e.g. (15)).


Conclusion. The distributional pattern of NPIs presented in this paper is explained by the movement theory (Drubig, 1994; Krifka, 1996). The in-situ approach fails to account for the difference between (14) on the one hand, and (8, 9, 10, 12) on the other. In cases of pied-piping, the semantic focus within the restrictor is determined by restricting the alternative set. This can be achieved by the mechanism proposed in Rooth (1992b).

[Semantic *focus* is marked by italics, the syntactic focus constituent (restrictor of ‘only’) is marked by underlining. The scope is marked by the little ‘hooks’. The examples with sentential negation serve as a baseline for the ones involving ‘only’. All examples were tested in appropriate contexts in an online survey:]

(1) ‘Only’ at LF



(2) Association with Focus by Movement



(3) ‘Only’ is DSE in its Scope but not in Restrictor

- a. i. Only John ‘ate vegetables’ b. i. Only students ‘ate kale’
 ii. Presupposition: John ate kale ii. Presupposition: Linguistics students ate kale
 iii. → Only John ‘ate kale’. iii. ↯ Only linguistics students ‘ate kale’.

(4) a. *Only any inhabitant of Twin Earth ‘ran into Particle Man’.

b. *Only an author of any comic ‘ran into Particle Man’.

c. Only Particle Man ‘ran into any inhabitant of Twin Earth’.

(5) a. Negation:

Only that John didn’t bring any present ‘was surprising’.

b. Generic/Universal Operator in Law-like statements (Horn, 1996; von Stechow, 1997):

Only anyone from Paris ‘would have known about this place’.

(6) a. That John didn’t bring any present was surprising.

b. Anyone from Paris would have known about this place.

(7) [only cut vegetables] [λx. John x]

(8) a. *John only ‘cut any vegetables’.

b. John didn’t *cut* any vegetables.

(9) a. *John only drove through any park.

b. John didn’t drive *around* any park.

(10) a. *She didn’t tell me when *anyone* will arrive. She only ‘told me that anyone will arrive’.

b. She didn’t tell me when *anyone* will arrive. In fact, she didn’t tell me *that anyone will arrive*.

(11) [[only a restaurant that John had recommended] [λx . she ‘complained about x’]]

(12) a. She didn’t ‘complain about a restaurant that John had recommended to anyone’.

b. *She only ‘complained about a restaurant that John had recommended to anyone’.

(13) a. [only his friends] [λ x. John gave any kale to x].

b. [only kale] [λ x. John gave x to any of his friends].

(14) a. John only gave any kale to his friends.

b. John only gave kale to any of his friends.

(15) a. She only budged an inch. (literal reading only, cf. Beaver (2004))

b. She only budged an inch because you did. (idiomatic NPI reading, cf. Beaver and Clark (2002) for a similar example)